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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Investors face a difficult task when they value a particular securities 
investment. They typically put money into an investment with the 
expectation of taking out even more money sometime in the future. Unlike 
more tangible investments, securities provide returns only through 
intangible rights to an issuer’s cash flows in the form of dividends and 
rights to assets in liquidation. As a result, having credible information on 
the nature of these intangible rights, as well as on the underlying business 
of the issuer, is important for individuals and entities seeking to value risk 
and expected return. Once they have this information, investors must also 
have the requisite expertise to evaluate it. Both gathering and assessing 
such information is costly. 
These problems persist after the initial investment; investors must 
decide how to manage their investment (for example, by exercising 
shareholder rights) and when to sell. Although an important component of 
share ownership is corporate governance rights, including the right to elect 
directors, many shareholders fail to exercise these rights. The explanation 
for shareholder passivity in large, publicly held corporations is 
straightforward. The dispersed shareholder body is poorly positioned to 
engage in effective collective action; the costs of monitoring management 
or leading a proxy contest typically far outweigh the benefits to an 
individual shareholder. As a result, shareholder collective action is rare, 
even though it may benefit shareholders as a group.1 
The information cost and collective action problems facing dispersed 
shareholders in public corporations create at least two possibilities for 
opportunism. First, corporations may attempt to issue securities at inflated 
prices, thereby shifting value from new investors to preexisting 
shareholders. Second, managers may take advantage of deficiencies in 
shareholder monitoring to expropriate a portion of the issuer’s value for 
their own private benefit through large salaries, insider trading, and other 
forms of self-dealing.2 
 
1. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal 
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1093-95 (1990) (explaining how 
divergence between private and social costs and benefits of collective action can result in 
suboptimal levels of shareholder activism). 
2. For example, Dennis Kozlowski, former CEO of Tyco International, is alleged to have 
used one million dollars of Tyco money to pay for his wife’s fortieth birthday party in Sardinia. 
See Melissa August et al., Numbers, TIME, Sept. 30, 2002, at 30. The ability of managers to 
expropriate value from shareholders may lead to additional ex ante costs on issuers. To enhance 
their ability to engage in insider trading, for example, managers may purposefully shift the 
company toward less valuable but more confidential (and variable) projects. See, e.g., Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of 
Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 331. 
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The market response to these problems is one of pricing. Investors 
aware of the possibility of opportunism will be more reluctant to invest and 
will demand a higher return (leading to a reduced price) to compensate 
them for the risks of self-dealing.3 Where investors cannot distinguish 
among corporations with varying risks of opportunism, they will discount 
all securities prices. The investors’ inability to identify riskier issuers leads 
to a classic lemons problem.4 Corporations that expropriate a lower amount 
from investors are given the same discount as corporations with higher 
levels of expropriation, creating a scenario in which the more investor-
friendly issuers may exit the capital markets.5 
Securities intermediaries offer a market response to the lemons 
problem. For purposes of this Article, we define intermediaries by their 
function as collectivizing agents for shareholders—providing services that 
benefit shareholders directly or indirectly.6 In particular, this Article 
focuses on information and activism services, which assist shareholders by 
providing information to the marketplace and by improving shareholder 
monitoring. Such intermediaries include auditors, who verify and report on 
the accuracy of corporate disclosures; analysts, who research and 
disseminate securities information to the marketplace; proxy advisors, who 
supply voting guidance and, in some cases, facilitate shareholder activism 
through the voting process; and others who increase shareholder 
information or reduce the costs of collective action. Individual shareholders 
themselves may take on an intermediary role when acting on behalf of all 
shareholders, such as when they initiate a proxy contest or introduce a 
 
3. See BERNARD S. BLACK ET AL., DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTER?: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE KOREAN MARKET (Korean Dev. Inst., Working Paper No. 02-04, 2002), 
http://www.kdischool.ac.kr/library/data/w02-04.pdf (providing evidence that a higher level of 
corporate governance protection for issuers listed on the Korean Stock Exchange results in higher 
Tobin’s Q valuations, among other measures, for issuers); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 15-16 (2000) (reporting evidence that 
coming from a common law jurisdiction has a statistically significant positive impact on Tobin’s 
Q valuations, and concluding that legal protections for minority shareholders result in increased 
valuations for issuers). 
4. For a description of the lemons problem, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for 
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).  
5. Alternatively, managers at otherwise more investor-friendly companies may adopt an “if 
you can’t beat them, join them” attitude and increase the amount of private benefits they 
expropriate. 
6. Other intermediaries, such as credit rating agencies, provide services to debt investors. See, 
e.g., Standard & Poor’s, at http://www.standardandpoors.com (describing credit rating services) 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2003). Because our proposal focuses on shareholders, these intermediaries are 
beyond the scope of this Article. Similarly, although many intermediaries, such as analysts and 
auditors, provide services that benefit both debt and equity investors, we focus here on the 
services provided to shareholders. 
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shareholder proposal. Issuers also benefit from intermediary services that, 
by reducing risk to investors, reduce the issuers’ cost of capital.7 
Intermediaries do not always function effectively, however. Indeed, the 
presence of high-reputation intermediaries may lull investors into a false 
sense of security, causing them to rely on the intermediaries and seek out 
less information on their own. Once lulled, investors may lose more money 
than when the investors enjoyed no intermediary-provided protections. 
Investors in Enron, for example, expected intermediaries to monitor and 
disclose the company’s financial condition and were misled by the 
intermediaries’ failure to identify and report the company’s problems.8 As 
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen overlooked widespread accounting 
violations and failed to report the company’s financial status accurately, 
leading to large investor losses.9 Securities analysts ignored serious 
indications of financial problems and continued to recommend Enron as an 
investment long after the company entered its death spiral.10 
As recent congressional inquiries and media reports have made clear, 
many of the problems with intermediary performance can be traced to 
conflicts of interest. Analyst reports are often influenced by a brokerage 
firm’s desire to attract or retain investment banking business.11 Firms that 
audit an issuer’s financial statements also provide lucrative consulting 
 
7. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305-07 (1976) (explaining 
how the reduction of risks to investors can reduce a firm’s cost of capital). 
8. For descriptions and analyses of the Enron scandal, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the 
Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002); and 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002). 
9. See Jonathan Weil, Enron’s Auditor Debated Partnership Losses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 
2002, at C1 (“Long before Enron Corp. took a massive charge in October for bad investments, 
Arthur Andersen LLP accountants knew of the growing losses. But they continued to bend to the 
wishes of Enron executives who didn’t want to recognize the losses and make them public.”). 
Andersen’s monitoring role was further compromised by its destruction of documents in the face 
of a widening SEC investigation. See Tom Hamburger et al., Staff Saw Document Shredding at 
Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2002, at A3 (reporting on Arthur Andersen’s role in document 
destruction at Enron). 
10. See Charles Gasparino & Tom Hamburger, Congress Broadens Probe of Enron Fall and 
Wall Street Role, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at C1 (reporting on a congressional investigation into 
“analysts who continued to recommend Enron’s stock . . . as the company careened toward 
bankruptcy”). 
11. For example, Jack Grubman, the premier telecom analyst of the late 1990s, recommended 
WorldCom and other telecoms despite worsening performance and sustained drops in stock price 
over 2000 and 2001. See Steven Rosenbush et al., Inside the Telecom Game, BUS. WK., Aug. 5, 
2002, at 34. Grubman’s motivation may have been affected by the prospect of investment banking 
business for his employer, Citigroup. See Charles Gasparino, Citigroup Chief Sanford Weill Will 
Testify in Salomon Probes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2002, at A1 (reporting that “Grubman, who is 
cooperating in Mr. Spitzer’s probe, has said he changed his rating [of AT&T] back in 1999 of a 
hold to the equivalent of a strong buy after what he regarded as nudging from Mr. Weill”). 
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services that compromise auditing independence. Even shareholder activists 
may be driven more by personal gain than collective shareholder welfare. 
The approach toward addressing the problems facing securities market 
intermediaries has largely consisted of piecemeal efforts to reduce these 
conflicts. In the case of analysts, the principal reform seeks to separate 
analyst research from investment banking business. Merrill Lynch recently 
entered into a settlement with the New York State Attorney General 
effecting a partial separation of these roles.12 The National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
have also implemented conflict-of-interest rules designed to increase the 
independence of analysts.13 Similarly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
forbids outside auditors from providing a wide range of consulting services 
to their audit clients.14 
Eliminating intermediary conflicts is a flawed solution, however. 
Someone has to pay for intermediary services, and eliminating conflicts 
may block an important source of financing. We argue that existing 
intermediary conflicts have arisen, in large part, because intermediary 
services are not self-supporting. Regulations that force the separation of 
 
12. The settlement between Merrill Lynch and Eliot Spitzer, the New York State Attorney 
General, provides that Merrill Lynch must compensate analysts based on criteria independent of 
their value to its investment banking business. See Cheryl Winokur Munk, Merrill Changes Stock-
Research Rating Process, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2002, at C16; Press Release, Office of the New 
York State Attorney General, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement To 
Reform Investment Practices (May 21, 2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/may/ 
may21a_02.html (describing the settlement terms). The Merrill-Spitzer settlement, nevertheless, 
does not completely separate analysts from investment banking; it allows analysts to receive 
compensation out of a financial firm’s general revenues, including those derived from investment 
banking. Id. 
13. See Randall Smith, New NASD Rule Limits Analysts at ‘Bake-Offs,’ WALL ST. J., June 6, 
2002, at C1 (noting that the NASD’s and NYSE’s rules, among other things, would place “a ban 
on analysts being paid for specific banking deals and disclosure of banking fees in reports” and 
“limit analysts’ ability to show banking clients the contents of future reports”). Under the rules, an 
analyst is precluded from “issuing a research report on a company if the analyst has participated in 
any meeting with the company prior to the time the firm is designated as an underwriter on 
a new issue.” Id. The SEC adopted the NASD and NYSE proposals on May 10, 2002. See  
Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,252, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,875 
(Aug. 4, 2003). 
14. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2003). It is 
unclear, however, whether the new legislation significantly increases the restrictions on auditor 
consulting services. Notably, the Act does not prohibit auditors from consulting on tax issues. See 
id.; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform 
(and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (questioning the amount of actual reform 
provided through Sarbanes-Oxley). The SEC has adopted new rules relating to the provision of 
nonaudit services. See Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor 
Independence, Exchange Act Release No. 47,265, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249, and 274). 
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires the SEC to adopt rules to address analysts’ conflicts of interest. 
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 501. In February 2003, the SEC adopted Regulation AC, which 
requires analysts to certify that the opinions disclosed in their research reports accurately reflect 
their personal views, and to disclose any compensation related to the recommendations contained 
in the reports. See Regulation Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-.505 (2003). 
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intermediary services from more lucrative services may reduce or eliminate 
services that are not independently profitable and may thus actually 
exacerbate existing shortages of intermediary services. In particular, 
although intermediaries presently provide information and technical 
support, their provision of more active services—such as the initiation of 
proxy contests—has been limited. 
Indeed, we argue that the persistence of intermediary conflicts signals a 
more general market failure. Individual transactions under the current 
market structure may fail to provide efficient levels of intermediary 
services, leading to excessive provision of some intermediary services and 
inadequate provision of others. Free riding and shareholder collective action 
problems inhibit the efficient provision of intermediary services. In many 
cases, issuers respond to these problems by acting as collectivizing agents, 
bearing the cost of services that benefit all shareholders. Issuers do this, for 
example, when they hire an outside auditor to certify their financial 
statements or when they disseminate a shareholder proposal in accordance 
with SEC Rule 14a-8.15 Similarly, some commentators have argued that 
managers used selective disclosures to subsidize analysts prior to the 
promulgation of Regulation FD, which severely curtailed such 
disclosures.16 Alternatively, intermediaries may cross-subsidize their 
activities with revenues from related business services. Analyst research, 
for example, has long been cross-subsidized, first from brokerage 
commissions and more recently from investment banking services.17 
Issuer-based subsidies, however, create a conflict of interest for 
intermediaries. Although companies may work to centralize the funding of 
securities market intermediaries, corporate managers allocate the 
company’s funds. Managers are more likely to fund intermediaries that 
favor managers than those that effectively curb management opportunism.18 
Control over allocation decisions enables managers to influence 
intermediary output, leading to biased research and other services. 
Similarly, cross-subsidization may encourage intermediaries to tailor their 
output to attract more lucrative ancillary business.19 
 
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
16. See Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 533, 545 (2002); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, 
and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1268-69 (2001). For a 
description of Regulation FD, see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,154, 73 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 3 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Selective Disclosure 
and Insider Trading]. 
17. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the 
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1046-48 (2003) (describing how subsidization of 
analyst research has evolved). 
18. At least in the area of selective disclosures, other solutions are possible to the problem of 
managerial opportunism. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 16, at 569-74. 
19. For example, auditors have been criticized for allowing their consulting business to 
influence their auditing vigilance. A 2001 SEC survey found that, among 563 Fortune 1000 
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Our central observation is that the problems plaguing securities 
intermediaries result from a financing dilemma. Absent cross-subsidies or 
issuer-based subsidies, the market cannot sustain the optimal level of 
intermediary activity. Understanding the issue as a financing dilemma 
suggests that reform proposals aimed at reducing conflicts of interest 
without identifying alternative funding sources will ultimately fail. Instead, 
fixing Wall Street requires a separate solution to the financing problem. 
This leads us to our main proposal. We put forth a new funding 
arrangement for intermediaries that preserves the central role of issuers in 
subsidizing the activities of intermediaries for the benefit of shareholders, 
but separates the source of funds from the allocation decision. We propose 
a voucher financing mechanism, under which issuers fund intermediary 
activity, but shareholders individually direct funding to their preferred 
intermediaries. 
Voucher financing is not problem-free, and we discuss problems with 
the proposal in Section V.B. In particular, for reasons we discuss in more 
detail below, we do not advocate substituting voucher financing for the 
current system of mandatory audits for issuers, although we would 
allow vouchers to fund supplementary auditing services.20 While recently 
proposed regulatory reforms to the auditing process may have 
shortcomings, we think it may be both premature and impractical to rely 
exclusively on voucher financing of auditors. For other types of 
intermediaries, however, we argue that the benefits of voucher financing 
outweigh the costs, and that voucher financing provides a superior 
alternative to existing financing mechanisms.21 
Our proposal has several important benefits: First, by using the issuer 
as the source for intermediary funding, the proposal highlights the fact that 
intermediary services benefit all shareholders collectively. Second, by 
removing the need for outside sources of funding, the proposal reduces the 
conflicts that result from existing forms of subsidization. Third, by 
consolidating intermediary funding within a single mechanism, the proposal 
facilitates efficient allocation of funding among different types of services. 
As a result, the proposal may reduce the total level of funding to 
 
companies studied, issuers paid their auditors $2.69 in consulting fees for every $1.00 in auditing 
fees. See Lynn E. Turner, Independence: A Covenant for the Ages, Remarks at the Conference of 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (June 28, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/spch504.htm (describing the survey’s findings). 
20. See infra Subsection V.B.3. 
21. Voucher financing could also, in theory, be used to fund the services of other types of 
intermediaries not considered in this Article. For example, one of us has argued elsewhere that 
management control over the selection and funding of outside counsel creates the potential for 
similar corruption. See Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in 
Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1123-26 (2003). Although voucher financing 
might provide a solution to this problem, the application of voucher financing to lawyers is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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intermediaries and eliminate the need for some existing mandatory 
subsidies. Consequently, rather than constituting an additional tax or levy 
on issuers, the proposal may reduce net costs for issuers. Fourth, by placing 
control over funding allocation in the hands of investors, the proposal 
reduces management influence over intermediaries and replaces it with 
direct accountability to shareholders. 
The combination of these effects is likely to affect the market for 
intermediary services dramatically. We expect a substantial increase in the 
number of independent intermediaries and, at the same time, a proliferation 
of new intermediary services for investors. Voucher financing will also 
complement securities regulations designed to protect investors. 
Strengthening private market intermediaries will reduce pressure on 
regulators to increase antifraud penalties and engage in more searching (and 
costly) enforcement actions.22 Voucher financing will provide a more 
flexible and market-driven means of subsidizing intermediaries compared 
with regulator-directed subsidies.23 Thus, while voucher financing may 
increase the provision of some intermediary services, it may also reduce the 
excessive provision of other services that, under the current system, results 
from market failure, regulatory error, or undesirable subsidization. Finally, 
reinforcing the role of intermediaries offers a meaningful mechanism for 
restoring (and maintaining) investor confidence in the securities markets. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II sets forth the collective action 
problem facing dispersed shareholders and the role of institutional investors 
in assisting collective action. Part III describes the role and function of 
securities market intermediaries. We describe existing intermediaries, the 
services they provide, and the structural problems that prevent them from 
fulfilling their investor-protection potential. Present and proposed legal 
responses to these structural problems are assessed in Part IV. Part V sets 
forth our proposal for creating truly independent intermediaries. Key 
components of this proposal include creating an independent source of 
intermediary funding, and allowing shareholders to control this funding 
through vouchers. 
 
22. For a related argument that securities antifraud liability should take into account 
alternative market-based mechanisms (which may vary systematically with issuer size), see 
Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 567 (1997). 
23. Regulators, for example, may make mistakes. See Roberta Romano, Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2378-79 (1998) 
(calling the SEC’s decades-long prohibition on disclosure of projected earnings “[o]ne particularly 
egregious example of the SEC’s problematic disclosure policies,” and noting that although “[t]he 
SEC modified its position in 1979 to permit the disclosure of projections within a safe harbor 
rule . . . even today the agency’s approach is still quite guarded” (citation omitted)). Regulators 
may also suffer from well-known public choice problems. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative 
Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 923-26 (1994) (providing a public choice explanation for the SEC’s 
continued existence despite its obsolescence). 
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II.  COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE ROLE 
OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
The central problem facing dispersed shareholders in a publicly held 
corporation is one of collective action.24 Dispersed shareholders unable to 
act collectively allow opportunistic managers to expropriate large private 
benefits of control.25 Any single shareholder who expends additional 
resources in monitoring management or coordinating with other 
shareholders to change management will typically bear the costs alone, 
while the profits generated by such action are shared by all shareholders, 
including those who do not contribute.26 
The free-rider problem also inhibits the provision of intermediary 
services. Intermediaries may attempt to sell their services to only a subset 
of investors, but some investors may free-ride off the payments of other 
investors. In addition, many intermediary services are in the nature of 
public goods.27 Information, for example, rapidly leaks into the 
marketplace, preventing analysts from capturing the full value of their 
research through sales of information broadly to the investing public.28 The 
public goods problem drives much securities research out of the public 
marketplace, causing many institutional investors separately to engage in 
costly research through internal buy-side analysts. As a result, investors 
may collectively produce duplicative and wasteful research. 
In addition to the general problem of collective action, shareholders 
also face a rational apathy problem. To the extent a shareholder believes it 
unlikely that her activism will be pivotal, the shareholder will not have any 
incentive to expend resources participating in corporate governance, such as 
the shareholder voting process.29 Actions requiring shareholder voting, 
 
24. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 1, at 1080-81 (examining the collective action problem 
facing shareholder voting). 
25. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 7, at 308-10. Managerial 
opportunism may become a particular problem where managers force firms to engage in a 
midstream shift, amending the corporate charter in the managers’ favor well after public (and now 
mostly passive) shareholders have purchased shares. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory 
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1573 (1989). 
26. See Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1009, 1017 (1994) (providing a general formula that describes the collective action problem). 
27. Public goods are defined by two key characteristics: lack of rivalry in consumption and 
nonexcludability of benefits. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 
(2d ed. 1997). 
28. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 726 (1984) (“As applied to the securities analyst, the 
public goods-like character of securities research implies that the analyst cannot obtain the full 
economic value of his discovery, and this in turn means that he will engage in less search or 
verification behavior than investors collectively desire.”). 
29. See Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of 
Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1441-42 (1964); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
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including the approval of mergers and the election of directors, therefore 
face a double problem of collective action—the need for individual 
shareholders to make expenditures that benefit the group, and rational 
shareholder apathy in the face of the ineffectiveness of a single vote. 
Collective action problems thus reduce the ability of shareholders to 
monitor corporations effectively. 
The presence of institutional investors—including mutual funds and 
pension funds—may reduce the collective action and rational apathy 
problems facing shareholders, but it may also introduce a new set of 
problems. In theory, institutional investors provide a private mechanism for 
the intermediation of dispersed shareholder interests.30 Fidelity Investments, 
for example, takes in a large amount of funds from individual investors and, 
in return, provides its investors with at least three services.31 Fidelity 
provides aggregation, allowing investors to purchase a diversified portfolio 
with only a small amount of money; it provides information services by 
employing its own buy-side analysts to cover the securities traded in its 
actively managed funds; and it provides the potential for collective action 
by centralizing the process of shareholder voting. 
The rise of institutional investors has resulted in a corresponding 
increase in the concentration of share ownership. For the largest publicly 
traded firms in the United States, almost sixty percent of the capital stock is 
in the hands of institutional investors.32 An institutional investor with a 
sizeable stake in a particular issuer should have, in theory, a much greater 
incentive than dispersed individual shareholders to make expenditures that 
will increase the total value of the company.33 Not only are institutional 
 
Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1079-80 (discussing 
shareholder rational apathy). 
30. Theory does not always match practice. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 515 (2002) (noting that empirical studies of U.S. institutional investor 
activism have found “‘no strong evidence of a correlation between firm performance and 
percentage of shares owned by institutions’” (quoting Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and 
Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 462 (Peter Newman ed., 1998))); see also Edward B. Rock, 
Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994) (discussing 
the possibility that shareholders with large block holdings in companies may themselves 
cooperate with management in pursuit of their own self-interest at the expense of all the 
shareholders as a group). For a response arguing that in certain situations, the possibility of bribes 
paid to large block shareholders may be beneficial to all shareholders, see Stephen J. Choi & Eric 
L. Talley, Playing Favorites with Shareholders, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 271 (2002). 
31. Boston-based Fidelity Investments has nearly $900 billion of managed assets. See 
Fidelity Investments Introducing Two New Stock Funds, BUS. WIRE, Dec. 21, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, Bus. Wire File.  
32. See Assets Surge for U.S. Institutional Investors and Public Pension Funds Increase 
Equity Control over Corporate America, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 26, 1997, LEXIS, Nexis Library, 
PR Newswire File. 
33. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 
2095 (1995) (arguing that the large stakes of institutional investors should give them sufficient 
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investors more likely to take individual actions that increase overall share 
value, but institutional investors also often enjoy repeat relationships with 
the corporations in which they invest, as well as with other institutional 
investors. Institutional investors as a result can coordinate with one another 
in overcoming collective action problems.34 Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that institutional investors are becoming increasingly active.35 
The rise of institutional investors, however, has not proved a panacea 
for the problems facing dispersed shareholders. In particular, institutional 
investors face their own type of agency problem.36 Fund managers direct 
the investment and management decisions of an institution, such as a 
mutual fund. The interests of the manager, however, may diverge from 
those of fund investors.37 For example, fund managers do not capture the 
full benefit of good performance. At the same time, managers may be held 
accountable for excessive management costs or losses. Moreover, fund 
managers are typically rated against one another on a frequent, short-term 
basis.38 The tournament aspect of assessing fund manager quality may lead 
 
incentives to monitor shareholder litigation). But see Fisch, supra note 26, at 1023-25 
(demonstrating that large stakes alone may not give institutions sufficient incentives to engage in 
activism). 
34. Higher levels of institutional investor share ownership in an issuer, for example, correlate 
with higher votes in favor of shareholder corporate governance issue proposals. See, e.g., Stephen 
Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233, 
262-63 (2000). 
35. See Aaron Lucchetti, A Mutual-Fund Giant Is Stalking Excessive Pay, WALL ST. J., June 
12, 2002, at C1 (describing Fidelity’s increasing shareholder activism). Institutional investors 
played a key role in the proxy contest over the merger between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq. 
See Pui-Wing Tam, Investors Continue To Disclose Position on H-P Acquisition, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 18, 2002, at B4. Voting assistance services provided by Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) proved to be a substantial factor in helping institutional investors evaluate the merger 
proposal. Robin Sidel et al., ISS Is Put in the Spotlight as H-P Claims Victory, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
20, 2002, at C20. Similarly, institutional investors are taking a more active role in supervising 
shareholder litigation by acting as lead plaintiffs. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: 
Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 702-21 (2002) 
(describing developments in institutions’ participation as lead plaintiffs in securities fraud and 
derivative litigation). 
36. For a general critique of relying on institutional investors to monitor managers, see 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 
723 (1995) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994)). Institutions (or more accurately, the money 
managers who allocate the institutions’ money) may also suffer from pervasive behavioral biases. 
For a discussion of institutional investor biases, see Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling 
Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated 
Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 641-48 (1996). 
37. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (1991) (“[T]he primary explanation for institutional 
passivity is not overregulation, but the insufficiency of existing incentives to motivate institutional 
money managers to monitor.”); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of 
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 473 (1991) (“[T]here are precious few 
incentives for money managers to act in the interests of their principals.”). 
38. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: 
The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 206-07 (1991) (“The investment 
manager trying to outperform the market average in each quarter or each year will always have an 
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managers to herd in their investment behavior. Although doing better than 
the crowd may increase a manager’s compensation marginally, doing worse 
than other money managers may result in the manager being fired.39 
Even absent an agency problem between money managers and their 
funds, institutional investors often face a conflict of interest in their 
relationships with issuers. Some institutional investors provide financial 
services directly to issuers. A financial services firm, for example, may 
manage the pension fund of an issuer and also provide the issuer with 
investment banking services. Institutional investors in such a position may 
shy away from directly challenging the managers of an issuer, when those 
managers also hire the institution to provide financial services.40 More 
generally, such institutions may avoid a reputation for shareholder activism 
out of the concern that an activist reputation will hurt an institution’s ability 
to obtain financial services contracts at other companies or to maintain 
good contacts with managers.41 
 
incentive to accept, even seek, a short-term premium for a portfolio stock.”). But see Bernard S. 
Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
811, 862 (1992) (contending that “[i]nstitutional myopia . . . looms larger in public perception 
than in reality, and institutional voice should reduce whatever myopia may exist”). 
39. See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 465 (1990) (providing an economic model under which money managers concerned 
about their individual reputations choose to herd in their investment decisions with other money 
managers). 
Fund managers also face considerable pressure to minimize management costs and expenses. 
Because of free riding, a fund that engages in shareholder activism will increase returns for its 
competitors while reducing its own returns by the costs of activism. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 
26, at 1022-24 (demonstrating how competition may make active monitoring irrational for 
institutional investors). 
Managers of public pension funds face an additional type of pressure—the pressure to 
further the political goals of their constituents or public officials who exercise control over the 
funds. As a result, public fund managers may pursue political goals at the expense of fund 
investors. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 801-04 (1993) (describing the political pressure faced by 
public pension fund managers). 
40. See Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance 
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 948 (1996) (noting that directors 
with business ties to the issuer “may have greater incentive to monitor management, in order to 
protect their own entities’ investment in the company. However, [such] directors also may 
approve managerial actions detrimental to shareholders in order to please management and thus 
secure their business relationships with the company”). The SEC recently promulgated new rules 
requiring investment advisors to disclose a variety of information related to their proxy voting: 
The new rule requires an investment adviser that exercises voting authority over client 
proxies to adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the adviser 
votes proxies in the best interests of clients, to disclose to clients information about 
those policies and procedures, and to disclose to clients how they may obtain 
information on how the adviser has voted their proxies. The rule amendments also 
require advisers to maintain certain records relating to proxy voting. 
Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2106, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6585 
(Feb. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). The new SEC rules may make it more difficult 
for fund managers to ignore shareholder value in proxy voting. 
41. Private institutional investors, for example, are notably reluctant to sponsor a proxy issue 
proposal contest. See Choi, supra note 34, at 240-41 (studying proxy contests of the early 1990s 
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These agency problems, conflicts, and business relationships have, for 
the most part, limited institutional willingness to engage in activism.42 
Many institutions that are unhappy with the management of a particular 
company simply exit by selling their shares.43 Institutional investors 
therefore present only a partial solution to the collective action problem 
facing individual investors. Moreover, legal restrictions may limit the 
shareholdings of any single institution, thereby ensuring the persistence of 
some collective action problems among even institutional shareholders.44 
As a result, although institutional activism makes collective action possible 
in ways not feasible for small individual investors, it cannot substitute for 
 
and finding that shareholder activists, unions, religious organizations, and public pensions 
sponsored the vast majority of shareholder proposals). The current regulatory climate may 
nonetheless reduce the ability of managers to favor particular institutional investors. For example, 
after the promulgation of Regulation FD, which restricted the ability of issuers to make selective 
disclosures of nonpublic material information to certain market participants, the ability of 
institutions to obtain superior inside information from managers was severely curtailed. See 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 16. 
Conflicts may also arise when institutional investors utilize their size and power to obtain 
preferential treatment. One example of such treatment is the disproportionate ability of institutions 
to participate in hot IPOs. In 2002, the NASD investigated J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., as well as 
the Robertson Stephens unit of FleetBoston Financial Corp., among others, for allocating 
disproportionately large portions of IPO shares to favored large investors. These investors 
typically paid oversized commissions in return. See Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, Two More 
Wall Street Firms Are Targeted in Trading Probe, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at A1. The 
NASD’s investigation followed a settlement with Credit Suisse First Boston in January 2002 
regarding similar IPO allocation abuses. See Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, CSFB Fines 
Employees in IPO Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at C1. 
42. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 38, at 210 (describing how the short-term focus of 
institutional investors can interfere with “the long-term planning, investment and business 
development of the corporation”). 
43. Jack Coffee has argued this point forcefully. See Coffee, supra note 37, at 1318-28. 
Despite the possibility of exit, institutions may choose not to exit for at least two reasons. First, 
because of the size of their holdings, some institutional investors cannot exit without substantial 
cost. See Robert F. Carlson, International Corporate Governance Network Managers and 
Shareholders: Bridging the Gap Using Corporate Governance To Increase Portfolio Returns, 
Address at the International Corporate Governance Network Roundtable on the Economic 
Value of Good Corporate Governance Practice (July 9, 1997), http://www.calpers-
governance.org/viewpoint/speeches/carlson1.asp (explaining that, because of CalPERS’s size, it 
“cannot simply sell the stocks of companies that are poorly performing, without negatively 
impacting the market as a whole”). Second, some institutions structure their holdings so as to 
maintain a broad-based portfolio (such as an index fund) and therefore lack the ability to exit. See 
id. (explaining that exit would be contrary to CalPERS’s indexing strategy and that CalPERS must 
therefore seek to improve its returns through corporate governance initiatives). Instead, for these 
institutions, improving present investments through shareholder activism provides the most cost-
effective way to increase their return. See Lucchetti, supra note 35 (reporting Fidelity 
Investments’ increasing activism with regard to excessive CEO compensation and noting that “big 
investors increasingly don’t like being forced to sell their stakes, a move that can have tax 
consequences and limits the universe of stocks available to the investors”). 
44. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
10, 16-31 (1991) (listing several legal impediments facing shareholders attempting to build large 
blocks of shares). Among other restrictions, Roe points to disclosure rules under the securities 
laws for block shareholders, prohibitions on short-swing profits, and state law fiduciary duties 
imposed on controlling shareholders as impediments to those attempting to build a substantial 
ownership interest in a company. See id. 
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effective participation by all shareholders. Intermediaries working in the 
collective interest of shareholders play a crucial role in reducing the cost of 
activism and minimizing free-rider problems.45 
III.  SECURITIES MARKET INTERMEDIARIES 
This Part provides a taxonomy of securities market intermediaries. Our 
focus is on intermediaries that serve as collectivizing agents for 
shareholders. We identify how auditors, analysts, proxy insurgents, and 
other market participants function as intermediaries in particular contexts, 
providing information and monitoring services to shareholders. In addition, 
we consider existing sources of intermediary financing and demonstrate the 
limited role of market constraints on intermediary behavior. 
A. Securities Analysts 
Securities analysts collect information about issuers, the securities they 
sell, and the industries in which they operate, along with general market 
factors, evaluating and synthesizing the information they obtain. Analysts 
then disseminate their research to the marketplace in the form of reports and 
recommendations. Information intermediation enables investors to 
discipline issuers indirectly through the market, adjusting the price at which 
they are willing to trade securities based on the information provided. 
Analysts can generally be divided into sell-side analysts (those 
providing information directly to the investing public) and buy-side 
analysts (those providing information to their employer, usually a mutual 
fund or other type of institutional investor).46 Typically, sell-side analysts 
provide general overall ratings or recommendations on specific companies 
as well as more detailed research reports. The rating systems advise 
investors whether to buy, sell, or hold the covered securities.47 Sell-side 
 
45. Intermediaries can also shield the reputation of specific institutional investors. An 
institution, for example, can point to ISS’s recommendation as the reason for its vote in a proxy 
contest. See Sidel et al., supra note 35. 
46. For a detailed description of analysts and their role in the securities markets, see Fisch & 
Sale, supra note 17, at 1040-43. 
47. Merrill Lynch presently employs a three-part rating system, assigning issuers to either 
buy, neutral, or sell categories. See Munk, supra note 12. Recent revisions to NASD and NYSE 
rules require firms to disclose various information about their rating systems, including definitions 
of the ratings, the percentage of rated securities in each category, and information detailing the 
relationship between trading prices and published ratings. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, 
Exchange Act Release No. 45,908, 77 S.E.C. Docket (CCH) 1737 (May 10, 2002) [hereinafter 
Analyst Release] (describing and approving rule changes). 
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analyst recommendations are highly influential in investor decisions, and 
changes in analyst ratings have a substantial effect on stock price.48 
Some sell-side analysts are funded through marketplace transactions, 
selling their information to investors. Value Line, for example, has 
provided independent investment analysis for decades through its Value 
Line Investment Survey publication.49 Over the past several years, Internet-
based independent investor advice has appeared. At www.fool.com, for 
example, investors can obtain both general investment advice and more 
specific analysis of individual companies.50 
Although analysts who are not affiliated with investment banks are 
sometimes categorized as independent analysts, there are reasons to 
question the true extent of this independence.51 Sanford Bernstein, Inc., for 
example, which is frequently touted as an exemplar of the independent 
analyst, is a unit of mutual fund operator Alliance Capital Management 
Holding L.P. This association might tempt Sanford Bernstein to tout the 
value of companies within Alliance Capital’s portfolio.52 As a recent Wall 
Street Journal article observed, 
[F]or all the talk of Bernstein’s independence, data researcher 
Thomson First Call notes that Bernstein’s current percentage of 
“sell” or “strong sell” ratings earlier in October [2002] was just 
5.4%, compared with 8.1% for all the research companies on Wall 
 
48. See, e.g., Scott E. Stickel, The Anatomy of the Performance of Buy and Sell 
Recommendations, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 25, 25 (describing the price impact of 
analyst recommendations and observing that analyst downgrades generate larger market reactions 
than positive recommendations); Rodney K. Rogers & Timothy J. Fogarty, Critically Examining 
“Sell-Side” Analysts’ Reports: A Theoretically Informed Content Analysis 4 (Oct. 2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
49. Information on Value Line, with a current staff of approximately seventy analysts, can be 
found at its website. See ValueLine.com, at http://www.valueline.com (last visited May 7, 2003). 
As of May 7, 2003, a one-year online subscription to the Value Line Investment Survey cost $598. 
See id. 
50. See The Motley Fool, at http://www.fool.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). Similarly, 
Morningstar, Inc. provides thousands of its own independent analyst reports for online 
subscribers. See Morningstar.com, at http://www.morningstar.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). 
Another entity, Gimme Credit, specializes in providing bond-related research to only institutional 
investors at a price of $18,000 per year. See Gimme Credit, at http://www.gimmecredit.com (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2003); see also Sandra Ward, Taking Credit: Balance-Sheet Sleuths Look for 
Snares in a Post-Enron World, BARRON’S, Feb. 11, 2002, at 32 (interviewing top personnel at 
Gimme Credit). 
51. See Larry Dignan, Is Independence All That?, WALL ST. WK. WITH FORTUNE, Nov. 21, 
2002, at http://www.pbs.org/wsw/news/featurestory_20021121.html (demonstrating that various 
supposedly independent analysts may be compromised by conflicting business relationships). 
52. See Susanne Craig, Will Investors Benefit from Wall Street’s Split?—Independent 
Research May Not Necessarily Mean Better Analysis, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at C1 
(identifying the potential conflict); cf. Robin Sidel & Susanne Craig, Wall Street Stock Research 
at a Crossroads—Independent Firms Are Sorely Tempted To Go for New Gold, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
8, 2002, at C1 (questioning whether Argus Research, a firm that does not engage in investment 
banking but does engage in money management, should be characterized as a “completely 
independent firm”). 
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Street; more recently, Salomon’s own percentage has been as high 
as 27.5%. So Bernstein hasn’t been as tough on stocks in general as 
the average Wall Street firm, despite the influence of investment-
banking relationships on the full-service firms.53 
In addition, studies suggest that, although independent analysts may be 
less optimistic than affiliated analysts, independent research does not 
necessarily produce better returns. Independent analysts often cover only 
a few firms.54 Although several independent firms have recently 
outperformed the Wall Street regulars, many high-profile independent firms 
have produced less impressive results.55 Additionally, a recent Starmine 
study showed that affiliated analysts produced more accurate earnings 
estimates than unaffiliated analysts.56 One possible explanation for this 
result is that affiliated analysts have better information because of their 
closer relationships with covered companies and synergies resulting from 
their proximity to investment banking business.57 An alternative 
explanation is that the subsidization of analyst research through investment 
banking revenues improves the quality of the analyst’s product by 
providing more financing, although the conflicts of interest may bias the 
reported recommendations. A third possibility is that affiliated analysts 
were lowballing their earnings estimates in response to management 
pressure.58 Whether or not independent research is more accurate, the 
amount of research provided through independent sell-side analyst channels 
is both limited and costly. 
A fundamental problem facing sell-side analysts (as compared to buy-
side analysts) is their inability to capture all of the benefits from research 
 
53. Kate Kelly & Randall Smith, Outsider Aims To Restore Citigroup’s Luster, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 31, 2002, at C1. 
54. See Robin Sidel & Susanne Craig, Does Independent Research Mean Better Stock Picks?, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2002, at C1 (describing independent firm Avalon Research Group, whose 
“universe” of recommendations as of October 30, 2002, totaled seven buy recommendations and 
twenty-eight sells). 
55. See id. (comparing the performance of independent research firms with that of investment 
banks). 
56. See Dignan, supra note 51 (questioning whether independent analysts outperform 
affiliated analysts and citing a Starmine study showing that affiliated analysts “have more accurate 
earnings estimates than independent researchers”); cf. Analyzing the Analysts: Are Investors 
Getting Unbiased Research from Wall Street?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., 
Ins. and Gov’t-Sponsored Enters. of the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 166-71 (2001) 
(statement of James K. Glassman, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute) (citing several 
empirical studies showing that consensus recommendations of analysts are profitable). 
57. See Rebecca Byrne, No-Name Firms Outshine Wall Street’s Big Guns, THESTREET.COM, 
May 8, 2002, at http://www.thestreet.com/markets/rebeccabyrne/10021311.html. The close 
relationships among analysts, covered companies, and the investment banking business may also 
lead analysts to sacrifice their objectivity. The recent Wall Street settlement involving the SEC 
and Eliot Spitzer, the New York State Attorney General, responds in part to the perceived 
corruption on the part of analysts. See infra Section V.D. 
58. Byrne, supra note 57. 
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through marketplace transactions because of the public good quality of 
information.59 Once an analyst’s research has been released to some 
investors, other nonpaying investors may learn of the research, either 
directly from the initial purchasers (who have every incentive to 
disseminate the information once they have traded based on it), or indirectly 
through changes in stock price.60 Subsequently, the analyst can no longer 
sell the information. The rational response for the analyst is to charge a very 
high initial price in an effort to recoup the cost of the research before its 
effects are dissipated. In addition, the public good problem causes many 
analysts to focus primarily on large-capitalization stocks where greater 
numbers of potential purchasers of information exist even in the face of 
free-riding problems. The inability of analysts to recoup their research costs 
thus reduces their incentive to cover mid- and small-capitalization stocks.61 
Independent analysts may also make their research available exclusively to 
large institutional investors who are willing to pay substantial fees and who 
will not disseminate that information to the general public.62 
The public good problem limits the quantity of independent research 
provided to the market. Instead, much of the sell-side analyst research in the 
market is supplied by large financial firms where analyst research is funded 
because of its effect on other business operations. Prior to the SEC’s 
deregulation of fixed commissions in 1975, brokerage firms used analyst 
research to compete for trading revenues.63 The cost of the analyst research 
was subsidized through the surplus revenues generated by relatively high 
 
59. See Coffee, supra note 28, at 725-27 (discussing the public good nature of securities 
research). 
60. See BENJAMIN MARK COLE, THE PIED PIPERS OF WALL STREET 62 (2001) (explaining 
that serious analyst research is costly and citing a study showing that institutional investors are 
generally unwilling to pay for such research). Note also that offers to purchase or sell large blocks 
of shares, for example, typically result in large countervailing price reactions, undermining the 
profit from an informational advantage. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really 
Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1253 n.92 (1990) 
(citing empirical studies detailing the magnitude of price reactions in response to large block 
trades).  
61. See Jeremy Kahn, Splitting Up the Street, FORTUNE, Oct. 28, 2002, at 30, 31 
(paraphrasing the belief of David Trone, Prudential’s brokerage stock analyst, that if firms 
separate research from banking, then analysts will drop coverage of small companies). 
62. See, e.g., Matt Krantz, Research for Individuals Can Cost a Bundle, USA TODAY, Nov. 
27, 2002, at 3B (explaining that most independent research firms do not sell to individual 
investors, and that those who do charge thousands or even hundreds of thousands of dollars per 
year). Similarly, Callard Asset Management, an independent firm that has placed highly in recent 
studies of analyst performance, makes its research available to individual investors for $5000 per 
year, but warns investors that the information is too complex and encourages them to invest in 
Callard’s investment fund instead. See id.; see also Phyllis Plitch, GovernanceMetrics Debuts 
New Corporate Governance Ratings, DOW JONES BUS. NEWS, Dec. 3, 2002, Westlaw Library, 
Dow Jones Wires Plus File (describing a new corporate governance rating agency’s plans to 
charge subscribers $18,000 per year). 
63. Firms could not compete directly for trading revenues by offering discounted commission 
rates due to a fixed commission structure. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 17, at 1046. 
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fixed commissions.64 A financial firm’s ability to provide high-quality 
recommendations generated client relationships that, in turn, led to 
commission revenue when those investor-clients traded (and thereby 
generated greater brokerage profits).65 Although subsidization through 
commission revenues produced some symmetry between the interests of the 
investors and those of the brokerage firm, since accurate research was more 
likely to generate repeat trading business, the subsidization nonetheless 
tended to compromise analyst accuracy by causing analysts to focus on 
generating transactions. This led to overly optimistic evaluations as well as 
an increased emphasis on growth and momentum stocks.66 
After the elimination of fixed commissions, a shift occurred in the 
source of analyst compensation. Competition reduced the profitability of 
executing customer trades, providing brokerage firms with less incentive to 
focus on trading volume.67 The substantially reduced commissions that 
resulted were no longer able to provide a significant revenue source for 
subsidizing analyst research. Financial firms turned to investment banking 
revenues instead.68 Ultimately, the source of analyst financing shifted to 
issuers, who funded analyst research indirectly through payment for 
investment banking services. Particularly during the late 1990s, analyst 
compensation rose steadily in tandem with higher investment banking 
revenues.69 Analyst contracts often contained clauses explicitly tying 
 
64. See id. (describing the use of fixed commissions to subsidize analyst research). 
65. Brokers, nonetheless, may not always act in the best interests of their investor-clients. 
Unscrupulous brokers may attempt to sell unsuitable securities to investors. See Richard A. Booth, 
The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread To Measure Risk, 54 BUS. LAW. 
1599 (1999) (describing the suitability doctrine). Brokers may also “churn” the accounts of their 
investor-clients, generating excessive trades (and thereby commissions). See Seth E. Lipner, The 
Law of Churning, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1999, at 309 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, 
Handbook Series No. B0-0092, 1999) (describing legal prohibitions against churning). 
66. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 17, at 1045-46 (demonstrating the effect of subsidization 
through commissions on analyst incentives). 
67. See, e.g., Harry S. Gerla, Swimming Against the Deregulatory Tide: Maintaining Fixed 
Prices in Public Offerings of Securities Through the NASD Antidiscounting Rules, 36 VAND. L. 
REV. 9, 11-16 (1983) (describing the development of various discounting practices in response to 
pressure from institutional investors). 
68. See Raymond L. Moss et al., The Wall Street Analyst: Rise and Fall of a Rock Star, in 
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2002, at 99 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 
B0-01A6, 2002). 
69. Mary Meeker of Morgan Stanley, for example, earned $15 million in 1999, with her 
compensation “directly linked to her ability to secure investment-banking fees for the firm.” Nick 
Wingfield & Colleen DeBaise, Morgan Stanley Tech Star Sued on Bullish Calls, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 2, 2001, at C1. In 1999, Morgan Stanley pulled in approximately $100 million in fees from 
helping to underwrite IPOs of Internet companies. Charles Gasparino & Randall Smith, Wall 
Street Scores in ’99, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at C1; see also Patrick McGeehan & Anita 
Raghavan, Wall Street Investment Bankers, Traders May See Year-End Bonuses Leap by 30%, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1997, at C1 (reporting that “[a]s the securities industry wraps up its most 
profitable year, firms are expected to dole out the biggest year-end bonuses ever . . . with some 
highly coveted merger-and-acquisition bankers and research analysts having their payouts 
doubled”). 
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compensation to the analyst’s contribution to the firm’s investment banking 
business.70 Significantly, without the subsidy from investment banking, it is 
unclear to what extent financial firms would continue to support analyst 
research.71 
Subsidization of sell-side analysts is not, per se, problematic. In theory, 
by subsidizing research through investment banking fees, the issuer acts as 
a collectivizing agent for its investors. As the issuer expends resources on 
the development and dissemination of information, its investors benefit 
while avoiding the free-riding problem (to the extent the use of issuer 
resources necessarily results in each investor bearing the expenditure 
indirectly and on a pro rata basis). In addition, for certain types of 
information—including inside information—the issuer not only represents 
an ideal collectivizing agent but also the lowest-cost source of 
information.72 
The problem with relying on issuers to subsidize analyst production of 
information is that control over such subsidies is vested in management. 
Management selects an issuer’s investment banker, thereby directing the 
research subsidy. Managers, however, may have objectives other than 
maximizing the ability of investors to evaluate the company fairly. The 
separation of ownership and control, and the resulting divergence between 
the interests of shareholders and managers, creates the potential for 
managers to use their control over analyst subsidies to increase their private 
gains. Managers typically benefit, for example, from high levels of analyst 
optimism, which allow the managers to maximize their compensation and 
 
70. Charles Gasparino, Analysts’ Contracts Link Pay to Deal Work, WALL ST. J., May 6, 
2002, at C1 (reviewing analyst compensation contracts from Credit Suisse First Boston and 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and reporting that in one contract “the analyst is offered 1% to 3% 
of ‘the firm’s net profit per transaction . . . with a cap of $250,000’ for investment-banking deals 
he helps bring in,” and that in another contract an analyst is provided with “‘banking-related 
compensation’”); see also Charles Gasparino, Latest Fuel in Analyst Probe: ‘Bonus’ Memos, 
WALL ST. J., May 30, 2002, at C1 (reporting that “[f]or years, research analysts at many Wall 
Street firms have written self-evaluations at bonus time to trumpet their roles in helping to win 
lucrative stock-and-bond underwriting and merger business”). 
At least two explanations exist for this linkage between analysts and investment banking: 
First, economies of scale may exist. To the extent that a firm provides investment banking 
services for an issuer, it will gain knowledge and expertise related to valuing the issuer’s 
securities. Second, the linkage between analysts and investment banks allows issuers to indirectly 
subsidize the research of analysts through higher fees for investment banks. Indeed, evidence 
exists that investment banks use the possibility of analyst coverage of a company to attract 
investment banking business. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 76-77 (describing Piper 
Jaffray’s tactics toward Antigenics). 
71. See infra notes 190-192 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that efforts at 
severing the connection between investment banking revenues and analysts have resulted in a 
decrease in analyst coverage of companies). 
72. Prior to the prohibition of selective disclosures pursuant to Regulation FD, managers 
could use such disclosures in part to subsidize analysts. See Choi, supra note 16, at 545; Goshen 
& Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 1268-69. 
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reputation.73 As a result, managers may discriminate among analysts, 
selectively providing support only to those analysts who favor management. 
At worst, analysts may then become corrupt and eschew unfavorable 
reports of companies that provide large payments to them or their firms.74 
Analyst recommendations become more a tool for selling securities than an 
objective evaluation. In turn, the financial firms may value the analyst’s 
work based on the analyst’s success at generating investment banking 
business, rather than the accuracy of its analysis.75 Corporate managers may 
direct investment banking business only to financial firms where the 
analysts recommend the issuer’s securities highly, perhaps more highly than 
warranted. Evidence exists suggesting that financial services firms routinely 
use analyst coverage as a carrot (or stick) to induce issuers to hire the 
intermediary for investment banking services. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, 
for example, allegedly dropped coverage of Antigenics, a biotechnology 
company, right after Antigenics chose another investment bank to help with 
a seasoned public offering of stock.76 Piper Jaffray also ceased providing 
market maker services for Antigenics stock.77 
 
73. In proposing the prohibition against selective disclosures under Regulation FD, the SEC 
voiced just such a concern. The SEC contended that issuers may use selective disclosures to bribe 
analysts to provide better-than-warranted recommendations for the issuer’s stock. See Selective 
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 
(Dec. 28, 1999). For an argument that less restrictive means are possible to allow selective 
disclosures while curtailing managerial opportunism, see Choi, supra note 16, at 569-74. 
74. The Wall Street Journal, for example, reported that Jack Grubman, a former prominent 
telecom analyst at Salomon Smith Barney (part of Citigroup), in defending against NASD 
charges, argued that Citigroup “wouldn’t let [Grubman] change his stance on the telecom 
company because it was a banking client.” Charles Gasparino et al., Wild Card: Citigroup Now 
Has New Worry: What Grubman Will Say, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2002, at A1. In the same article, 
the Journal also reported that Citigroup placed pressure on Grubman not to paint AT&T, an 
eventual investment banking client of Salomon Smith Barney, in a negative light.  
Claims of analyst corruption are not unique to Salomon Smith Barney. See, e.g., Susanne 
Craig, Massachusetts Claims CSFB Stock Reports Led Investors Astray, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 
2002, at C1 (reporting allegations made by Massachusetts state securities regulators that CSFB’s 
investment banking department exerted “undue influence on the firm’s research department”). 
75. Certainly, higher banking revenues contribute to higher analyst compensation. See, e.g., 
Charles Gasparino, Spitzer Staff Gathers Salomon E-Mails Criticizing Grubman, WALL ST. J., 
July 16, 2002, at C1 (quoting analyst Jack Grubman as saying “[m]y compensation is a function 
of many factors. . . . One of those factors is banking revenues to the firm”). Analyst firms, 
nevertheless, have denied tying analyst compensation directly to investment banking fees. See id. 
Evidence shows, however, that such assertions are false. See, e.g., supra note 70 (discussing 
evidence of explicit contractual ties between analyst compensation and investment banking 
revenue). 
76. See Randall Smith & Geeta Anand, Analyze This: Stock Research Comes Under Fire in 
CEO’s Battle, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2002, at A1. 
77. See id. Market makers provide liquidity for a particular stock, holding themselves out as 
continuously willing to sell (at a specified bid price) and purchase (at a specified ask price) 
the stock. 
Partially in response to the conflicts facing analysts, several new intermediary-driven 
information services have also recently appeared in the market. Standard & Poor’s (S&P), for 
example, recently launched a new corporate governance rating service. See Louis Lavelle & Amy 
Borrus, . . . And a New Early-Warning System for Investors, BUS. WK., Oct. 28, 2002, at 101. 
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Company-subsidized financing for analysts may also crowd out 
independent analysts in the market to the extent that investors are unable to 
distinguish those analysts who operate independently of management from 
analysts who are indirectly subsidized by management.78 Investors, for 
example, are less likely to pay for Value Line reports when they are able to 
obtain research reports from Merrill Lynch and other brokerage firms 
(receiving an indirect subsidy through their investment banking divisions) 
at little or no cost. 
Should we care about analyst financing? Some argue that analysts and 
others who engage in securities research may already have incentives to 
generate too much information from a societal perspective. Ian Ayres and 
one of us have noted that private parties engaged in information research 
take into account both the cost of such research and the potential private 
returns from the research (e.g., if the informed trader receives a higher 
expected return from her trades).79 Parties engaged in research ignore, 
however, the systematically lower returns to uninformed traders taking 
opposite trading positions as well as ancillary impacts from informed trades 
(including an increase in the accuracy of the stock price of the issuer).80 
Failing to internalize the costs to uninformed traders from informed 
securities trades, private parties therefore may engage in superoptimal 
levels of research from a societal perspective.81 Competition among traders 
to become the first with an information advantage may further widen the 
 
Unlike most analysts, S&P plans to obtain financing from covered issuers, charging up to 
$100,000. Id. (noting S&P’s claim that “its access to company insiders and internal documents 
will make for a more nuanced rating”). Questions exist, however, whether S&P’s reliance on 
financing directly from issuers may lead to a similar conflict of interest. Proponents nonetheless 
argue that institutional investors will pressure companies both to obtain an S&P corporate 
governance ranking and to publicize the ranking. See id. 
78. Many analysts provide their information to the market for free. See, e.g., Wall Street 
Research on Demand, at http://money.cnn.com/markets/multex/index.html (last visited May 7, 
2003) (providing free access to reports published by analysts at 250 different firms). Some 
services, most prominently Thomson Financial, collect and redistribute analyst information. See 
Thomson Financial: Thomson ONE Analytics, at http://www.thomson.com/financial/financial.jsp 
(under “Thomson ONE Analytics” hyperlink) (last visited May 7, 2003) (describing services 
provided by Thomson ONE Analytics, formerly FirstCall). In addition, analyst reports and 
recommendations are widely disseminated through the media. See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, 
American Air Announces a New Round of Cost Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at C9 (reporting 
an upgrade by analyst Raymond Neidl and quoting his research report). 
79. See Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 
328-36 (2002) (setting forth a model of internal and external impacts from trades based on an 
information advantage). 
80. See id. at 328-29. 
81. It is also theoretically possible for private traders to engage in too little securities research 
to the extent that the gain from more accurate securities prices exceeds the private cost to 
uninformed traders from such informed trades. See id. at 346. Note that for securities research, 
which merely accelerates the timing of when information is disclosed (i.e., the information would 
have been disclosed anyhow later in time), the likelihood of more accurate securities prices 
outweighing the private cost to uninformed traders is minimal. See id. at 362-63. 
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gap between the incentives of private parties and societal welfare, leading 
to excessive levels of research.82 
Nonetheless, broadly distributed securities research—coupled with 
mandatory disclosure—plays a valuable role in disseminating information 
to the marketplace, reducing the incentive of dispersed investors to engage 
in wasteful, duplicative research.83 Once a sell-side analyst provides 
information to the entire market on a particular research topic, the value to 
active traders of engaging in the same research is necessarily diminished, if 
not eliminated, leading to lower levels of buy-side research.84 One could 
argue that the prevalence of buy-side analysts in the current system 
demonstrates the absence of market confidence in the quality of sell-side 
analysis and reflects precisely such waste.85 Enabling sell-side analysts to 
distribute information effectively may result, therefore, in a lower aggregate 
level of expenditures on research (as the widespread presence of sell-side 
information reduces the value of engaging in dispersed buy-side research).86 
The Ayres and Choi approach combats the overincentive of investors to 
engage in securities research by granting issuers the right to control 
informed trading in the issuer’s own stock. Alternative sources of funding 
for sell-side analysts, including our voucher financing proposal, provide 
another route to reduce overinvestment in research on the part of active 
traders through the provision of information to the market as a whole.87 
B. Auditors 
Analysts are not the only information intermediaries. Federal law 
requires public corporations to have their financial statements reviewed and 
 
82. See id. at 343-45 (discussing the incentive of private, dispersed investors engaged in 
competition with other investors to engage in excessive research from the standpoint of social 
welfare). 
83. See Coffee, supra note 28, at 733-34 (discussing how mandatory disclosure reduces the 
incentive of analysts to engage in duplicative research efforts). 
84. Of course, dispersed buy-side analysts may engage in secondary and complementary 
research building upon sell-side research. Nonetheless, to the extent the sell-side research targets 
the higher-return research first, this secondary and complementary research will produce lower 
expected returns. In the aggregate, therefore, dispersed buy-side analysts will engage in less 
overall research expenditures. 
85. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 17, at 1041 n.18 (stating that approximately sixty percent of 
existing analysts are buy-side analysts). 
86. For a further discussion of this point, see Stephen J. Choi, The Need To Subsidize Even 
Wasteful Analyst Research (Mar. 6, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
Voluntary subsidies to analysts from issuers (at the discretion of managers), of course, may fill the 
vacuum. In this case, the rationale for more independent financing of analysts becomes the 
displacement of more biased manager-funded analysts with more independent analyst research. 
87. In addition to the free-riding problem, analysts may fail to distribute information broadly 
to the market for a separate reason: Private, independent research analysts will have a strong 
incentive to restrict the distribution of research. Too wide a distribution necessarily reduces the 
trading value of the information (and in the limit, where the entire market has the information, the 
value will approach zero). For a discussion of this point, see id. (manuscript at 7-8 & n.20). 
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certified by an independent accounting firm.88 The auditor issues a financial 
report certifying that the financial statements have been prepared in 
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).89 
Auditing is big business; in 2001, accounting firms earned approximately 
$10.6 billion in audit fees.90 
Auditors typically receive compensation directly from the audit client 
through what is ostensibly a marketplace transaction. Johnson & Johnson 
paid $9 million to PricewaterhouseCoopers for auditing services in 2001, 
for example.91 Traditionally, however, the issuer’s managers have exercised 
substantial control over the selection of auditors. This creates the potential 
for conflicts of interest, in that managers can choose auditors with a 
promanagement bias.92 Although shareholders are often given the nominal 
power to ratify management’s selection of auditors, the voting mechanism 
typically does not give shareholders the power to veto management’s 
choice or to select an alternative auditor.93 
At the same time, auditors have offered an increasing number of 
nonauditing services to their audit clients. In many cases the fees for these 
services substantially exceed the fees for auditing work.94 In 2001, for 
example, Johnson & Johnson also paid $57.8 million to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers for nonaudit services, including several million 
dollars for design work related to Johnson & Johnson’s financial 
 
88. Many SEC filing documents, including public offering registration statements and 
periodic information filings, require audited financial statements. For an overview of the role of 
auditors under federal securities regulation, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 9.6 (4th ed. 2002). 
89. See id. 
90. Stephen Taub, Reverse Charge: Qwest Takes $41 Billion Impairment Hit, CFO.COM, Oct. 
29, 2002, at http://www.cfo.com/Article?article=7994. 
91. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Auditors Still Perform Nonaudit Services, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 
2002, at C1. 
92. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act may address this problem by vesting the board audit committee 
with greater authority to control the selection and compensation of the issuer’s auditors. See 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 202, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2003). The SEC has adopted 
a new rule to implement the audit committee requirements imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. See 
Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, 68 
Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, and 274). 
Issuers also must disclose when they change their auditor in a Form 8-K filing with the SEC. See 
17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2003). The form itself is available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
forms/form8-k.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2003). 
93. See Klaus Eppler & R. Bruce Steinert, Jr., Drafting the Proxy Statement, in PREPARATION 
OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 2002, at 737, 767 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, 
Handbook Series No. B0-018D, 2002) (“Since the 1930s it has been customary to have 
shareholders vote to approve the selection of the auditors although in most cases there is no legal 
requirement for such approval.”). Some companies have moved to dispense with shareholder 
approval entirely. See id. 
94. A 2002 survey of Chicago firms found that issuers, on average, paid consulting fees to 
their auditors that were three times as large as the audit fees. See Janet Kidd Stewart & Andrew 
Countryman, Local Audit Conflicts Add Up: Consulting Deals, Hiring Practices in Question, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 24, 2002, at C1. 
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information systems.95 Prior to Enron’s collapse, Arthur Andersen provided 
not only auditing services, but also a range of consulting work for Enron.96 
Tax and information technology consulting services, in particular, have 
become highly profitable. 
The financial importance of consulting services to accounting firms and 
the ability on the part of managers to dangle other revenue sources before 
auditing firms may compromise the quality of audits. In particular, 
managers may use a reduction in their purchase of nonaudit consulting 
services as a disciplining device, punishing auditors that do not take a 
promanagement point of view.97 Competition among auditors to obtain 
business from managers, in turn, may lead auditors to accept a reduced 
auditing fee in the hope of obtaining other service business from 
managers.98 Moreover, even those auditors that do not provide consulting 
services experience some influence from the client’s managers. To the 
extent that an auditing-only firm faces the possibility of termination at the 
hands of managers, the auditing-only firm (dependent entirely on its 
auditing income) will face pressure to adopt a promanagement viewpoint.99 
In addition, an auditor that provides consulting services gains a stake in 
the transactions that it has structured, and thus may lack the independence 
to subject those transactions to rigorous auditing scrutiny.100 Importantly, 
investors are poorly placed to discipline auditors for substandard work. 
Although investors may penalize the issuer’s stock price by selling, this 
reaction may only occur long after the fact, when the deficiencies of the 
auditor’s work eventually come to light. Auditors, of course, may care 
about their long-term reputations with investors. Individual (and 
 
95. See Bryan-Low, supra note 91. 
96. See Deborah Solomon, After Enron, a Push To Limit Accountants to . . . Accounting, 
WALL ST. J., Jan 25, 2002, at C1 (“In Enron’s case, the Houston company paid Arthur Andersen 
LLP $25 million for its audit and $27 million for nonauditing work, including tax-related and 
consulting services, in 2000, the last year for which figures are publicly available.”). 
97. Jeff Gordon voices a similar idea in a recent article on Enron. See Gordon, supra note 8, 
at 1237-38 (discussing the possibility that issuers may employ auditors for nonaudit related 
consulting services in order to give issuers a low-visibility way of sanctioning auditors—e.g., by 
terminating such consulting services—that go against the wishes of management). 
98. An individual audit partner, for example, may choose to sacrifice the audit fee (and 
indeed compromise the quality of the audit and, more generally, the reputation of the entire audit 
firm) in order to increase the individual partner’s own overall profits. See also Gordon, supra note 
8, at 1238 (“Accountants cannot afford to compete on their relative independence. The willingness 
to expose oneself to low-visibility sanctions—the sacrifice of inherent independence—offers such 
a competitive advantage in attracting audit clients that there will be a race to the bottom.”). 
99. The influence of managers is limited to the extent the issuer must make a report to the 
SEC in the event an auditor resigns, is dismissed, or declines to stand for reelection. Such 
disclosure is required under Item 4 of Form 8-K. See supra note 92. 
100. In part, the difficulties accountants face may stem from a confirmation bias. Under the 
confirmation bias, people tend to confirm the correctness of their prior decisions regardless of 
whether the decisions were in fact correct. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral 
Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2003) (manuscript at 8 n.31, on file 
with authors) (describing the confirmation bias). 
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decentralized) decisionmakers within an auditor, nevertheless, may not take 
into account the full value of reputation, sacrificing it in return for a more 
direct personal profit (through higher revenues from clients seeking to 
engage in aggressive accounting, for example).101 
C. Proxy Advisory Services 
Intermediaries also provide information directly related to shareholder 
monitoring. Proxy advisors, for example, analyze director performance, 
shareholder proposals, and election contests, and provide shareholders with 
guidance as to how to vote. 
The largest and most influential independent proxy advisor is 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).102 ISS provides information and 
analysis to help institutional investors understand the financial implications 
of proxy proposals and to cast informed votes.103 Run as a fee-based service 
with 750 clients worldwide, ISS prepares detailed reports analyzing the 
proxy issues for approximately 22,000 shareholder meetings per year.104 
Reports include an analysis of the issues subject to shareholder vote, voting 
recommendations, and explanations of the reasons behind the ISS position. 
ISS also offers a mechanism through which institutions can outsource the 
voting process to ISS. Through this program, an institution can delegate the 
physical part of voting—receipt of ballots, share reconciliation, casting 
votes, and recordkeeping—to ISS, which casts the vote according to ISS’s 
voting guidelines or the institution’s customized instructions.105 For these 
services, ISS charges its institutional investor clients annual fees that range 
from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands of dollars.106 
A number of other firms also provide proxy advisory services or 
otherwise collect governance data for the purpose of providing information 
to facilitate shareholder monitoring. The Council of Institutional Investors 
 
101. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8, at 1239 (“[T]he compensation of the Houston partners 
was significantly tied to their client billings both for auditing services and for consulting services. 
Enron might have been a relatively small client for Andersen, the firm, but it was the largest client 
for its Houston office, and, for the Enron relationship partners, perhaps their only significant 
client.”). 
102. For information on ISS’s services, see About ISS, at http://www.issproxy.com/ 
about/index.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2003). 
103. See Sidel et al., supra note 35 (stating that ISS’s recommendation in favor of the 
Hewlett-Packard and Compaq merger “helped bolster H-P’s position in one of the most 
contentious proxy battles in recent years”). 
104. See Solutions for Institutional Investors, at http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/ 
index.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2003). 
105. See Voting Agent Services, at http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/proxy/vas/ 
index.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2003). 
106. See Paul Taylor, HP-Compaq Vote To Test Adviser’s Influence, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 
2002, 2002 WL 13657104 (quoting Jamie Heard, ISS chief executive, as stating that ISS annual 
subscriptions range from “a few thousand dollars to well into six figures”). 
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(CII), for example, seeks to “encourage member funds, as major 
shareholders, to take an active role in protecting plan assets and to help 
members increase return on their investments as part of their fiduciary 
obligations.”107 CII actively monitors submissions and results of 
shareholder initiatives, including on its website information on the text of 
submitted shareholder proposals and the resulting shareholder votes.108 
Significantly, in cases in which a company has failed to respond to a 
majority shareholder vote in favor of a proposal, CII sends the issuer a letter 
inquiring as to the company’s intentions. The issuers’ responses are posted 
on CII’s website.109 Although some of CII’s information is publicly 
available, CII is member-financed, and its full range of services is available 
to members only.110 
Despite the presence of firms providing proxy advisory services, not all 
shareholders contract for such services. Some investors may continue to 
believe (rationally) that their vote has little chance of being pivotal and 
therefore find investment in deciding how to vote wasteful.111 Other 
investors may simply choose to free-ride on the efforts of investors who do 
pay for the advice of proxy advisory services. Since ISS makes its positions 
publicly known, and since institutional investors can communicate with 
each other anyway, an institution need not subscribe in order to obtain 
ISS’s voting recommendations. Moreover, few individual investors pay for 
advice on how to vote on various proxy issue proposals and control 
contests.112 
 
107. See Council of Institutional Investors, at http://www.cii.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). 
108. See Council of Institutional Investors, Shareowner Initiatives, at http://www.cii.org/ 
shareowner2.asp (last visited Aug. 31, 2003). 
109. See id. 
110. For information on obtaining membership to CII, see Council of Institutional Investors, 
Council Memberships, http://www.cii.org/membership.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). Voting 
membership is open to public and corporate pension funds, at an annual cost of $1.30 per $1 
million in assets, but no less than $3000 and no more than $30,000. See id. The CII also has 
Educational Sustainers, which include issuers, mutual funds, and even law firms with annual dues 
ranging from $7000 to $10,000. See id. 
A few other organizations provide services similar to those of ISS on a smaller scale. Two of 
the better known are the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and Davis Global 
Advisors. IRRC provides proxy research, agency voting services, proxy monitoring, and proxy 
guidelines through consulting services and customized software. See Investor Responsibility 
Research Center, at http://www.irrc.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). Services are provided on a 
subscription basis. Davis Global Advisors monitors corporate governance developments, assists 
institutions in drafting governance guidelines, and provides advice on governance monitoring. See 
Davis Global Advisors, at http://www.davisglobal.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). 
111. See sources cited supra note 29 (describing the rational apathy problem). 
112. Institutional Shareholder Services, for example, gears specific services to corporations 
and to institutional investors. No such services are tailored for individual investors. See 
Solutions for Institutional Investors, at http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/index.asp (last 
visited May 1, 2003). 
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Given our earlier analysis of institutional activism,113 one might wonder 
why any institutional investors are willing to pay even for current levels of 
funding of proxy advisory services. The answer may come, in part, from the 
ERISA requirements that pension funds consider their beneficiaries’ best 
interests when voting stockholdings.114 Subscribing to a proxy advisory 
service and voting in accordance with its recommendations is a relatively 
low-cost and safe way to meet these requirements. Accordingly, ERISA 
indirectly sustains a minimal level of intermediary proxy advisory 
activity.115 Institutions that subscribe for the sole purpose of meeting their 
legal obligations as fiduciaries, however, may be less apt to demand 
accountability from ISS.116 
Perhaps because of the underfunding of proxy advisory intermediaries 
(relative to their contribution to shareholder welfare), the market for proxy 
advisors does not seem able to support extensive competition. Within the 
last several years, ISS has absorbed two of its main competitors—Fairvest 
Corporation, which was the leading provider to institutional investors of 
Canadian corporate governance research and related services,117 and Proxy 
Monitor, the second-leading proxy services firm, which merged with ISS in 
July 2001.118 The inability of the market to support competitive production 
of proxy advisory services suggests potential public good and free-riding 
obstacles, despite the existence of marketplace transactions. 
Limited competition leads to two problems. First, the high cost of proxy 
advisory services makes them largely unavailable to individual investors.119 
Second, the virtual monopoly endows services like ISS with a tremendous 
 
113. See supra Part II (discussing the incentives of institutional investors to engage in 
shareholder activism). 
114. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2(1) (2003); see also Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Retirement Board, 
Avon Products, Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), in 15 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 391, 392 (Feb. 29, 1988) 
(asserting that “with respect to proxy voting . . . [an] investment manager or other responsible 
fiduciary [must] keep accurate records as to the voting of proxies”). 
115. The new SEC rules imposing disclosure requirements on investment advisor proxy votes 
may also put pressure on investment advisors to turn to ISS (or a similar intermediary) to provide 
justification for their votes. See supra note 40 (discussing the new SEC investment advisor proxy 
voting rules). 
116. See, e.g., Ed Leefeldt, The Power Behind Proxy Fights, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, May 
2002, at 63, 65 (quoting money manager Tim Ghriskey as stating that “[a]nybody worried about 
having to justify their vote will blindly follow ISS”). 
117. See Institutional S’holder Servs., Canadian Market Services, at 
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/proxy/canada/index.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2003) 
(describing Fairvest as a wholly owned ISS subsidiary). 
118. See Robin Sidel, After This Deal, Is Anyone Left To Give Advice?, WALL ST. J., July 26, 
2001, at C1. 
119. Recent shareholder proposals introduced at a few companies have sought to have the 
company hire a proxy advisor, with corporate funds, for the benefit of all shareholders. See, e.g., 
Gillette Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 1, 2001), 2001 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 175, at *2-3 
(rejecting arguments that a shareholder proposal requesting the board to hire an independent proxy 
advisory firm can be excluded from the issuer’s proxy statement).  
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amount of power.120 Recently, for example, the NYSE and NASDAQ 
adopted rules requiring shareholder approval of all executive stock option 
plans and, in addition, eliminating the authority of brokers to vote on such 
plans without explicit shareholder instructions.121 As a result, approval of 
stock option plans for many large publicly traded companies will essentially 
depend on the vote of institutional investors. ISS’s influence over this vote 
indirectly provides ISS with the ability to influence executive compensation 
across all NYSE-listed companies.122 
Although the services provided by proxy advisory intermediaries are 
not extensive, they appear to be reliable.123 Nonetheless, one potential risk 
is that these intermediaries may be subject to conflicts of interest.124 In the 
vote on the 2002 merger between Compaq and Hewlett-Packard, for 
example, one commentator, a securities analyst, raised allegations of such 
conflicts with respect to ISS.125 SEC filings revealed that a substantial 
percentage of ISS was owned by venture capital firm Warburg Pincus, that 
Warburg was a general partner of ISS, and that three Warburg partners sat 
on the eight-member ISS board of directors.126 Significantly, Warburg 
Pincus had been involved in a number of business deals with Hewlett-
Packard.127 Another substantial owner of ISS was Hermes, an asset 
management firm that manages four of the seven largest pension plans in 
the United Kingdom. The analyst alleged that ISS’s position with respect to 
 
120. See, e.g., Martha McNeil Hamilton, Player in the Proxy Wars; HP-Compaq Merger Has 
Brought Shareholder-Services Firms out of Obscurity, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2002, at E01 
(describing ISS as “something close to a monopoly”); Tom Johnson, Proxy Analysts Take 
Spotlight in Merger: Compaq, HP Await Recommendation, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 5, 2002, at B1 
(describing the power wielded by ISS in mergers and proxy contests). 
121. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,108, 68 Fed. Reg. 
39,995, 39,996, 39,999 (June 30, 2003). 
122. Interestingly, ISS recommended that shareholders vote against a proposal requesting a 
board of directors to hire an independent shareholder advisory firm. See E-mail from Mark 
Latham, Coordinator, The Corporate Monitoring Project, to Shirley Westcott, ISS (Mar. 22, 
2000), http://www.corpmon.com/ResponseToISS.htm (quoting from the ISS recommendation). 
123. See Johnson, supra note 120 (describing ISS as “the only independent U.S. firm 
providing investors with advice on merger and shareholder contests”).  
124. See Leefeldt, supra note 116, at 64. Indeed, ISS, which is a private company, does not 
disclose either the revenues it receives or the fees it charges. Id.  
125. See Linda Rosencrance, Investment Advisory Firm’s Relationship to HP Questioned, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 5, 2002, at http://www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/ 
management/story/0,10801,69909,00.html (describing allegations by Bill Parish, a registered 
investment advisor with Parish & Co., that ISS had an undisclosed conflict of interest). 
126. See Uniform Application for Investment Adviser Registration (Form ADV) for 
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (Mar. 27, 2002), at http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/ 
Content/ViewForm/ADV022001/Sections/iapd_AdvScheduleBSection.asp (providing a search 
form with which a visitor can find ISS’s Form ADV).  
127. See Rosencrance, supra note 125. 
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the merger might have been influenced by Hermes’s customer relationships 
and the prospect of future asset management fees for Hermes.128 
Similarly, because ISS generates substantial revenues from the services 
that it provides to institutional investors, which include corporate pension 
funds and other institutions with Wall Street loyalties, ISS may face 
constraints on its ability to criticize management decisionmaking. Indeed, 
ISS is able to sell its services most profitably to nonactivist institutions that 
prefer to delegate their proxy decisionmaking to a third party. A stance that 
is too critical on the part of ISS may lead such institutions—many of whom 
depend on corporate managers for ongoing pension fund management and 
investment banking business—to eschew ISS’s services. In addition, ISS 
offers consulting services to corporations for the purpose of assisting 
corporate management in drafting corporate governance proposals, poison 
pills, and executive compensation plans.129 The sale of these services would 
be threatened if ISS appeared too critical of corporate management.130 
Indeed, ISS has recently come under attack for selling issuers access to its 
corporate governance rating system.131 For a fee of approximately $15,000, 
a corporation may gain access to ISS’s online service, which the 
corporation may then use to improve its score dramatically—often by 
making a series of modest governance changes.132 Obviously, the process of 
selling issuers the access necessary to improve their governance ratings 
raises questions about the value of those ratings. 
D. Shareholder Activism 
Individual shareholders may also act as collectivizing intermediaries.133 
Shareholders may increase investor welfare simply by providing 
information. For example, several large institutional investors, including 
 
128. See Press Release, Parish & Co., Proposed HP Merger: Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) Found Not Independent and Along with Barclays Plays Key Role in Microsoft 
Pyramid Scheme (Mar. 18, 2003) (on file with authors). 
129. For more information on ISS’s services for corporations, see Institutional S’holder 
Servs., Solutions for Corporate Issuers, at http://www.issproxy.com/corporate/index.asp (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2003). 
130. See Leefeldt, supra note 116, at 64 (explaining that ISS charges corporations a fee for 
advising them as to how to meet its guidelines on corporate governance). As Leefeldt describes it, 
corporations may feel pressure to do business with ISS in order to obtain a favorable voting 
recommendation. Similarly, although ISS maintains a separation between its consulting and 
research services, its independence with respect to such recommendations may be affected by its 
corporate consulting services. See id. 
131. See Monica Langley, Making the Grade: Want To Lift Your Firm’s Rating on 
Governance? Buy the Test, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2003, at A1 (describing ISS’s sales of access to 
its rating system and resulting criticisms). 
132. See id. (explaining the procedure by which an issuer may buy access and the ability of 
an issuer subsequently to affect its ratings). 
133. Shareholders may also provide monitoring services by initiating or supervising 
shareholder litigation. 
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CalPERS and TIAA-CREF, have begun publicly announcing their proxy 
voting decisions along with the reasons for those decisions.134 These 
announcements reduce the information and monitoring costs to other 
shareholders of casting an informed vote. In addition, shareholders are 
currently the exclusive source of more activist services. An individual 
shareholder who chooses to launch a proxy contest to change the board of 
directors or who proposes a corporate governance initiative designed to 
increase shareholder welfare acts in the collective best interest of all 
investors in the company. Even a large institutional investor that uses its 
ownership position to pressure management informally benefits all 
investors. Indeed, some empirical studies identify a correlation between 
institutional activism and higher overall returns, suggesting that 
institutional activism provides value to shareholders.135 
In theory, intermediaries could attempt to sell activist services to 
investors in the market. Indeed, certain intermediaries already act as 
strategic advisors and proxy solicitors for investor activists. Firms such as 
Allen Nelson & Co. assist dissident shareholders in mounting proxy 
contests and describe themselves as “devising innovative tactics to enhance 
corporate governance” through their battles for corporate control.136 
The free-riding problem, however, is even larger for shareholder 
activism than for the provision of information research. With respect to 
sales of information, initial purchasers retain an advantage over other 
investors. As a result, investors are willing to pay for information based on 
their ability to profit before the information is broadly disseminated into the 
market. In the case of activism, on the other hand, investors who refuse to 
pay are just as well off as investors who pay for such actions. Investors who 
do not pay for the services of a proxy contest insurgent benefit from the 
change in management to the same extent as investors who do pay for such 
services (in proportion to their shareholdings). To the extent investors are 
 
134. For examples of public announcements of voting intentions in the Hewlett-Packard and 
Compaq merger vote, see Tam, supra note 35. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(2)(iv) (2003) 
(excluding public announcements by shareholders on how they intend to vote, including public 
speeches and press releases, from the definition of a proxy solicitation). 
135. See, e.g., Claire E. Crutchley et al., Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS’ Activism, 
7 FIN. SERVS. REV. 1 (1998) (finding that visible and aggressive institutional activism leads to 
substantial increases in shareholder wealth); Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by 
Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227 (1996) (finding increased 
shareholder wealth for issuers that responded to targeting by CalPERS). The evidence, however, 
is not entirely one-sided. Some institutional investors may myopically price companies, favoring 
near-term over long-run earnings. See Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-
Term Earnings over Long-Run Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 20 (2001) (finding evidence 
that institutional investors with short-term investment horizons prefer to invest in firms with a 
greater proportion of value in near-term earnings). 
136. See Allen Nelson & Co., Inc., Corporate Control, at http://www.worldproxy.com/ 
corporatecontrol/body_corporatecontrol.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2003) (describing Allen 
Nelson’s work as a strategic advisor in corporate control contests and offering visitors a link to a 
chronicle of battles for corporate control managed by Allen Nelson & Co.). 
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dispersed and ignore the benefit of their actions on other investors, such 
investors will have a large incentive simply to free-ride off the efforts of an 
intermediary rather than purchase the intermediary’s services. 
As a result, activism is largely self-financed. Some shareholders receive 
a return for their activities through an increase in the value of their own 
shares. The successful bidder in a tender offer, for example, is rewarded in 
part by the extent to which its efforts raise the value of all shares in the 
company including the bidder’s own prebid block of shares. Large 
institutional investors that put pressure on management to raise share value 
also benefit as their shareholdings increase in value. Despite the possibility 
of benefiting through share ownership, an activist shareholder that owns 
only a fraction of the outstanding shares will be undercompensated for 
activism that promotes the best interests of all shareholders. 
At the same time, shareholder activists bear the full costs of their 
efforts—costs that often are substantial. A 2001 Bloomberg Markets article 
reported that shareholder-sponsored proxy contests cost an average of $6.2 
million each.137 Although the laws of most states allow the corporation to 
subsidize voluntarily a challenger’s proxy expenses, as a practical matter, 
reimbursement is only available if the challenger mounts an election contest 
that is successful in changing control of the board.138 Reimbursement may 
also require shareholder approval in some cases.139 Financing constraints, as 
Bebchuk and Kahan have noted, may lead to a suboptimally low level of 
shareholder activism.140 Indeed, proxy contests are rare. According to one 
report, activists have launched an average of twenty-five proxy contests a 
year since 1996, and most such contests have involved relatively small 
companies.141 
Alternatively, shareholder activists may subsidize their activism 
through private gains. The successful bidder in a control contest may 
receive a private gain to the extent that it subsequently uses control to 
expropriate value from remaining public shareholders or other corporate 
 
137. Edward Robinson, Sam Wyly, Cowboy Investor, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, Sept. 2001 (on 
file with authors). 
138. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 1, at 1106 (noting that “companies generally pay all 
the expenses for the reelection campaign of incumbents, but reimburse challengers only if they 
gain control over the board of directors”). 
139. See id. at 1109 (discussing the need for successful proxy insurgents to obtain 
shareholder approval before receiving reimbursement of expenses); see also Steinberg v. Adams, 
90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (finding reimbursement appropriate where it was approved 
by both the board and a majority of the shareholders); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane 
Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (upholding the right of shareholders to reimburse 
successful proxy contestants “subject to the scrutiny of the courts when duly challenged”). 
140. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 1, at 1093 (“[E]ntry decisions might be skewed 
because contestants do not internalize the full change in company value. Rather, any change in 
company value will accrue to a contestant only to the extent that she owns stock of the 
company.”). 
141. See Robinson, supra note 137. 
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constituencies. Shareholder gadflies may reap personal value from the 
attention associated with the sponsorship of proxy proposals.142 In the 
context of proxy issue proposals, evidence exists suggesting that unions and 
charitable organizations may sponsor proposals to generate publicity for 
causes in which they specifically have a stake or to gain bargaining 
leverage over management.143 Public pension funds may be motivated by 
political objectives such as the desire to provide benefits to local 
constituencies.144 Activists may also obtain payments from corporations in 
exchange for dropping their challenges. Computer Associates International 
Inc. paid dissident shareholder Sam Wyly $10 million, for example, to 
terminate his proxy fight for board representation.145 The private gains of 
activists may therefore be in tension with—or even come at the expense 
of—shareholder welfare, calling into question the desirability of activist-
sponsored proxy contests and other initiatives.146 In addition, shareholder 
activists seeking private benefits may have too great an incentive to engage 
in such actions relative to the best interests of the group of all 
shareholders.147 
E. Administrative Services 
Intermediaries also provide technical assistance that facilitates 
shareholders’ exercise of their governance rights. The most visible example 
 
142. See, e.g., Chris Davis, USX Split Approved by Shareholders, PITT. BUS. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2001, http://pittsburgh.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2001/10/22/daily34.html (noting how 
“[c]orporate gadfly/shareholder activist Evelyn Davis . . . relish[ed] her one-on-one audience with 
[USX CEO Thomas] Usher” at a shareholders’ meeting, and stating that Davis publishes an 
annual newsletter containing “her own observations about corporate America”). 
143. See Joann S. Lublin, Unions Brandish Stock To Force Change, WALL ST. J., May 17, 
1996, at B1 (noting that a Teamsters-sponsored shareholder proposal on executive pay at Union 
Pacific Corp. “coincided with a bitter fight over organizing new union members at the railroad 
company’s Overnite Transportation unit”). But see Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, 
Should Labor Be Allowed To Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 44 (1998) 
(finding that a set of labor-sponsored proposals in the 1994 proxy season received at least as much 
support as other shareholder-sponsored proposals). 
144. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 26, at 1044 (describing efforts by public pension funds to 
influence corporate policies for political reasons as a type of private gain); see also Mary 
Williams Walsh, Calpers Wears a Party, or Union, Label, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, § 3, at 1 
(describing CalPERS’s use of its influence over corporate decisionmaking to promote social and 
political objectives). 
145. See Paul Horvitz, CA Pays Wyly To Conclude Proxy Fight, NAT’L POST, July 24, 2002, 
2002 WL 23739951 (describing the agreement between Computer Associates and Wyly). 
146. See id. (quoting Computer Associates director Jay Lorsch’s defense of the payment to 
dissident shareholder Sam Wyly as good for shareholders because “we need to get Sanjay 
[Kumar] and the rest of management focused on making money, not these distractions”).  
147. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 1, at 1094-95 (noting that the divergence between 
private costs and social costs may lead to more than the socially optimal level of shareholder 
activism). 
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of this type of intermediary is Automatic Data Processing (ADP).148 ADP 
administers the distribution of proxy solicitation material and the collection 
of voting instructions for virtually all U.S. securities that are held in 
nominee or “street” name.149 Banks and brokers who hold stock as 
nominees hire ADP. Securities Exchange Act Rule 14b-1 requires nominee 
holders, such as brokers, to take various steps to provide proxy material to 
beneficial owners and to obtain voting instructions from those owners.150 
ADP then acts as the agent for banks and brokers in distributing required 
information in connection with the shareholder voting process. In addition, 
ADP has developed a range of mechanisms that facilitate shareholder 
voting. Through the ADP process, shareholders can vote by mail, by 
telephone, and even over the Internet.151 ADP then aggregates shareholder 
voting instructions and delivers them directly to the issuer. 
The costs for ADP’s services are borne by issuers. Under a pilot 
program established in 1997,152 NYSE Rules 451 and 465 require issuers to 
pay for ADP’s distribution of proxy material according to a set fee schedule 
that has been approved by the SEC.153 Because ADP’s fees are determined 
by regulation, it is difficult to determine the relationship between the fees, 
which can be substantial, and the true cost of ADP’s services. As of August 
2001, for example, ADP’s fees in connection with the proxy fight between 
Computer Associates International Inc. and Ranger Governance Ltd. 
amounted to $1.33 million plus postage.154 Several commentators have 
questioned the fee rates.155 They have observed, for example, that ADP 
charges issuers a premium for electronic distribution of proxy material even 
 
148. For information on ADP, see Automatic Data Processing, Inc, at http://www.adp.com 
(last visited May 1, 2003). 
149. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 45,644, 67 Fed. Reg. 
15,440, 15,440 (Mar. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Proxy Reimbursement 2002] (reporting that ADP 
currently distributes close to one hundred percent of the proxies sent to beneficial owners holding 
stock in street name). 
150. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (2003); see also N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., THE OFFICIAL 
CONSTITUTION AND RULES OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE R. 451 (2002), LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, N.Y. Stock Exch. Const. & Rules File (requiring member firms, upon receiving proxy 
solicitation material, to forward that information to beneficial owners together with a signed proxy 
or a request for voting instructions).  
151. ADP allows shareholders to vote their proxies online. See Proxy Vote, at 
http://www.proxyvote.com (last visited May 7, 2003). Investor Communication Services, a 
division of ADP, facilitates various mechanisms of shareholder proxy voting. For more 
information on Investor Communication Services, see Proxy Processing/Dividend, at 
http://ics.adp.com/release6/public_site/products/Issuers/dividend.html (last visited May 1, 2003). 
152. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 38,406, 62 Fed. Reg. 
13,922 (Mar. 24, 1997) (describing the “One-Year Pilot Program”). 
153. See, e.g., Proxy Reimbursement 2002, supra note 149 (approving the most recent 
modifications to the fee schedule). 
154. See Paul Schreiber, In the Middle of Big Battle; ADP Unit Plays Major Role Behind the 
Scenes, NEWSDAY, Aug. 27, 2001, at C14. 
155. For the most recent release, see Proxy Reimbursement 2002, supra note 149. 
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though such distribution is less costly than mail distribution.156 Similarly, 
ADP is able to reduce its costs through the use of bulk mail discounts, but 
those discounts are not fully passed on to issuers.157 The fee structure is 
particularly problematic in light of ADP’s monopoly, which eliminates the 
potential for its rates to be subjected to a market test.158 
Problems with the ADP structure may arise from the fact that, although 
ADP provides services for the benefit of issuers and shareholders, ADP is 
not accountable to either group.159 Banks and brokers, who hold securities 
as nominees, make the decision to retain ADP as an intermediary for 
technical assistance in connection with shareholder voting but importantly 
do not pay ADP’s fees. Issuers in particular have criticized the ability of 
banks and brokers to select ADP (or another technical assistance 
intermediary) for depriving the issuers of control over the process of 
 
156. See Letter from Paul Conn, Executive Vice President, Computershare Ltd., and Steven 
Rothbloom, President, Computershare Investor Services (US), to the SEC (Feb. 6, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse200153/conn1.htm (commenting on Self-Regulatory 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 45,263, 67 Fed. Reg. 2264 (Jan. 16, 2002), and stating 
that “in the United States, issuers are charged a ‘premium’ for electronic distribution whereas 
elsewhere in the world electronic distribution is offered at a discount”). 
157. See Letter from Carl T. Hagberg, Chairman and CEO, Carl T. Hagberg & Associates, to 
the SEC (Feb. 4, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse200153/hagberg1.htm (commenting on 
Exchange Act Release No. 45,263 and describing how ADP retains half the savings in postage 
that arise from bulk processing services). 
158. Issuers have criticized the reimbursement rates set by the NYSE and advocated a 
market-based alternative. See Proxy Reimbursement 2002, supra note 149, at 15,442; see also 
Tony Lystra, ADP Faces Renewed Fire on Proxy and Prospectus Costs, Competition, MUTUAL 
FUND MARKET NEWS, July 30, 2001, 2001 WL 2252013 (describing attempts by potential 
competitors to challenge ADP’s monopoly). 
159. Importantly, ADP exercises substantial control over the manner in which it transmits 
information to shareholders and over the voting mechanisms that it provides. Issuers and investors 
have occasionally identified problems with the manner in which ADP performs its functions. For 
example, in 1989 CalPERS called for a reexamination of ADP’s predecessor, IECA, as part of its 
proposed comprehensive revisions to the federal proxy rules. See Letter from Richard H. Koppes, 
General Counsel, CalPERS, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC 
14-15 (Nov. 3, 1989), reprinted in Edward D. Herlihy & David A. Katz, Developments in 
Takeover Tactics and Defense, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1991, at 7 app. A (PLI 
Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B4-6954, 1991). In 1993, ADP was widely 
criticized for a series of processing errors. See Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial 
Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. REV. 485, 510-11 (1994) (describing 
proxy tabulation problems that occurred at ADP during the 1993 proxy season); Elizabeth Lesly, 
A Number-Cruncher Gets an “E” for Errors, BUS. WK., May 24, 1993, at 35. Again in 1996, 
reports surfaced of some problems with ADP’s operations. For example, the Council of 
Institutional Investors was pushed to investigate vote-tallying problems after the votes of two 
institutional investors at the Kmart annual meeting were tallied incorrectly. See Matthew Greco, 
Kmart Mix-Up Engenders Wider Look at Voting Irregularities, INVESTOR REL. BUS., June 24, 
1996, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Investor Rel. Bus. File; see also Union of Needletrades Indus. & 
Textile Employees v. Kmart Corp., No. 96-629078 CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1996), reprinted in Daniel 
M. Taitz & Lance J. Gotko, Shareholder Communications, in DOING DEALS 1997, at 133 exbt. D 
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B4-7168, 1996) (reporting errors in the 
votes cast by ADP). Nonetheless, the only avenue of complaint for shareholders is the New York 
Stock Exchange, which is controlled by member firms with a financial interest in retaining the 
existing structure. 
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distributing proxy materials to shareholders.160 Indeed, ADP’s monopoly 
may be due in part to the fact that ADP rebates part of the fees that it 
obtains from issuers to banks and brokers.161 These rebates can amount to 
as much as thirty-seven percent of the fee paid by an issuer.162 
IV.  THE FINANCING CHALLENGE 
While intermediaries presently provide many services for investors in 
the capital markets, they face numerous obstacles. As the previous Part 
demonstrated, market failures may lead to inadequate funding of some 
intermediaries. Financing constraints, for example, may explain the relative 
infrequency of proxy contests and the absence of marketplace competition 
among proxy advisors. Issuer-based subsidies can lead to intermediary 
corruption at the hands of corporate managers who allocate the subsidies 
out of corporate coffers. Moreover, financing problems do not always lead 
to underfunding. Overfunding is also possible, as may be the case with 
duplicative buy-side analyst research.163 
This Part directly addresses the challenges present in financing 
intermediaries. Section A specifies the financing dilemma and describes the 
problems that can result from existing sources of financing. Section B 
considers the two dominant legal responses to the financing dilemma: 
mandatory issuer-based subsidies and restrictions on conflicts of interest. 
A. Identifying the Financing Dilemma 
Existing market intermediaries are financed in three ways: market 
transactions with investors, issuer funding, and cross-subsidization.164 Some 
intermediaries charge recipients of their services directly through market 
 
160. See Proxy Reimbursement 2002, supra note 149. 
161. See, e.g., Chris Kentouris, Recordkeepers Protest NYSE’s Proxy Mailing Fees, SEC. 
INDUSTRY NEWS, May 25, 1998, at 13 (describing the Council for Institutional Investors’ 
criticism of “ADP’s practice of rebating some fees to financial intermediary clients” and noting 
the Securities Transfer Association’s statement that “the rebate procedure fosters ADP’s 
monopoly”). 
162. See Letter from Rachel E. Kosmal, Senior Attorney, Intel Corp., et al. to the SEC (Feb. 
6, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse200153/kosmal1.htm (commenting on Exchange Act 
Release No. 45,263 and stating that “some banks and brokers receive as much as 37% of the 
current ‘mail elimination’ fees paid by the issuers to the service providers”). 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82. 
164. As discussed in Part III, a fourth possibility exists: intermediary self-financing. 
Shareholder activists, for example, typically rely on self-financing (obtaining a return from 
increases in the value of their shareholdings, among other things). See supra Section III.D. 
Self-financing is not a panacea, however. To the extent a shareholder activist owns less than one 
hundred percent of the issuer, the shareholder will not internalize the full gain from its activities 
for all shareholders. Worse still, the activist may finance himself through the pursuit of his own 
self-interest rather than the maximization of overall shareholder welfare. 
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transactions. Examples of these intermediaries include pure research analyst 
firms and proxy advisors such as ISS. These intermediaries offer the highest 
degree of independence because of the market’s ability to impose 
accountability through pricing. As described above, however, market 
imperfections may hinder the provision of many intermediary services. 
Free-rider and public good problems limit the ability of intermediaries to 
capture the value of their efforts through market transactions. In particular, 
the value of intermediary services to any specific investor is limited to the 
potential effect of those services on the value of the investor’s own specific 
portfolio, irrespective of the overall gain to investors as a group. 
Other intermediaries receive payment from issuers, either directly or 
indirectly through the issuers’ purchases of other services. To the extent 
that intermediary activities benefit issuers and their investors, issuers serve 
as ideal collectivizing agents, causing shareholders to incur the cost of 
intermediary services in proportion to their financial interest. Examples of 
issuer-funded intermediaries include auditors and administrative services 
providers such as ADP. Issuers pay auditors directly for their auditing 
services. Issuers also indirectly subsidize auditing services by retaining 
their auditors for consulting and other services.165 ADP likewise receives 
funding, pursuant to NYSE rules, from issuers.166 
One problem with issuer funding lies with the allocation decision. 
Management typically decides where to direct the funds, allowing managers 
to reduce the quality of the information provided by intermediaries as well 
as to constrain the ability of intermediaries to act as effective monitors.167 
Issuer funding also may not result in the optimal amount of subsidies for 
intermediaries. To the extent an intermediary may impact a number of 
different firms, any individual firm will not completely internalize the 
benefit of providing subsidies to the intermediary. For example, a proxy 
contest proponent may provide a deterrent effect for managers at multiple 
firms. No individual firm, however, will capture fully the value of this 
deterrence. Management may also lack the proper incentives to determine 
efficient funding levels, preferring instead to underfund intermediaries who 
may constrain managerial opportunism.168 
 
165. But see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g) (West Supp. 2003) 
(prohibiting auditors from providing certain nonaudit services to certain entities, including most 
public companies). 
166. See supra text accompanying notes 152-154 (discussing NYSE rules requiring issuers to 
pay mandatory fees to providers of proxy administrative services). 
167. Likewise, in the case of ADP’s administrative services, banks and brokers are able to 
choose the recipient of issuer funding in exchange for side payments from ADP, leading to actions 
on the part of ADP arguably not in the best interests of the issuer or shareholders. See supra text 
accompanying notes 152-158 (discussing financing for ADP). 
168. In the alternative, managers may seek to supply excessive funding to intermediaries who 
acquiesce in assisting the managers—including, for example, analysts who provide overly 
optimistic earnings forecasts.  
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Intermediary services are also financed through cross-subsidization. 
Analyst research has been cross-subsidized with brokerage and investment 
banking revenues. Analysts may also subsidize their research through 
personal trading.169 Investor activists may cross-subsidize proxy contests by 
engaging in activism that generates (at least in part) private gains for the 
activists. Cross-subsidies may generate conflicts that cause an intermediary 
to sacrifice the quality of information or services provided. Such conflicts 
could, for example, lead an analyst to recommend a corporation in order to 
garner greater investment banking revenue from the corporation despite a 
negative outlook for the firm. Similarly, an activist may pursue private 
gains to such an extent as to sacrifice the best interests of the group of all 
shareholders. 
Intermediaries therefore face two interrelated problems. First, market-
based transactions may fail to produce efficient levels of intermediary 
services. Second, issuer-based financing solves this collective action 
problem, but often creates a conflict of interest by making intermediaries 
accountable to management rather than to investors. The challenge, then, is 
to identify a financing mechanism that creates a sufficient economic 
incentive for the provision of socially valuable intermediary services 
without sacrificing the quality of such services. 
B. Existing Legal Responses 
Recognizing that market failures may lead to suboptimal levels of 
intermediary services, lawmakers have, in some cases, provided subsidies 
through mandatory issuer-based financing. At least two aspects of the legal 
responses are noteworthy. First, despite the fact that financing poses a 
common challenge to the various types of intermediaries, lawmakers have 
taken several different approaches to conflicts and other problems that arise 
from the funding problem, rather than identifying commonalities across all 
intermediaries. The lack of a consistent approach has often resulted in 
regulators ignoring funding issues in favor of more visible conflict-of-
interest problems, leaving many intermediaries with inadequate sources of 
funding. Second, mandatory financing requirements are limited to the least 
 
169. Under newly adopted NYSE and NASD rules, analysts are prohibited from certain 
personal trading. See Analyst Release, supra note 47, at 1748. The rules prohibit: 
analysts and their household members from: (1) purchasing or receiving pre-IPO shares 
in companies/industries that are the subject of their research reports; (2) trading in 
recommended securities thirty days prior and five days after issuance of a research 
report or a change in rating or price target; and (3) trading in a manner contrary to the 
analyst’s recommendations. 
Id. Some brokerage firms have implemented more extensive restrictions on personal trading by 
their analysts. See, e.g., Megan Barnett, No More Buying for Merrill Analysts, INDUSTRY 
STANDARD, July 10, 2001 (on file with authors) (describing a newly instituted Merrill Lynch 
policy prohibiting analysts from investing in companies that they cover).  
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controversial intermediary services. Thus, mandatory financing typically 
does not extend to innovative services, even though such services may 
suffer most from financing problems. This Section describes the legal 
responses. 
1. Mandatory Issuer-Based Subsidies 
If financing is the problem for collectivizing intermediaries, one simple 
solution would be to force issuers to provide more funds. Issuer-based 
financing collectivizes the interests of investors, using the company’s 
resources to pay for services accruing to the interests of all investors in the 
company. The political viability of mandatory subsidies is limited, 
however, by the need for regulators to determine the amount of the subsidy 
and to identify appropriate recipients. Nonetheless, various regulations 
mandate both direct and indirect issuer-based subsidies of intermediation. 
The shareholder proposal rule, SEC Rule 14a-8, offers one example of 
a mandatory subsidy. The rule requires that management include certain 
types of shareholder-initiated proposals in the company’s proxy. The cost 
of distributing the proposal to shareholders is then borne by the company 
rather than the sponsoring shareholder. Rule 14a-8 subsidizes an activist’s 
decision to bring certain types of initiatives before the shareholder body for 
a vote by requiring the company as a whole to bear some of the costs of the 
solicitation.170 
As a subsidy for shareholder activism, Rule 14a-8 is notoriously 
incomplete. First, the rule significantly limits the types of proposals that 
must be included on the company’s proxy statement. In particular, 
proposals that deal with ordinary business matters or that attempt to 
interfere with the role of the board of directors in managing the corporation 
are forbidden.171 As a result, many proposals, such as those seeking to 
declassify boards of directors and those attempting to remove poison pills, 
are couched in precatory terms that have no binding effect on the 
company.172 In addition, the rule cannot be used to nominate competing 
candidates for the board of directors.173 Second, although the inclusion of 
 
170. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2003). 
171. See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (prohibiting a proposal “[i]f the proposal is not a proper subject 
for action by shareholders”); id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (prohibiting a proposal “[i]f the proposal deals 
with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations”); see also Jill E. Fisch, 
From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1155-62 
(1993) (describing the scope of exclusion for ordinary business matters). 
172. Even precatory proposals may nevertheless put pressure on managers. See Choi, supra 
note 34, at 241-42 (noting that managers may voluntarily implement a precatory proposal that 
garners a high vote in favor of it, to avoid “damaging publicity,” among other reasons). 
173. See Fisch, supra note 171, at 1162-65 (describing failed proposals for shareholder 
nomination of directors along with the existing exclusion of shareholder proposals that relate to 
elections to office). 
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the proposal reduces costs for sponsors, the sponsors must still bear the cost 
of convincing other shareholders of the value of their proposal. Third, use 
of the shareholder proposal rule is not completely cost-free; the ambiguous 
scope of some of the regulatory exclusions coupled with the SEC’s policy 
of reviewing management efforts to exclude a proposal on a case-by-case 
basis can generate substantial legal expenses for activists. Perhaps in 
recognition of the fact that the subsidy provided by Rule 14a-8 is of limited 
value, some shareholder activists have begun bypassing the rule by 
undertaking separate proxy solicitations or by introducing floor resolutions 
at the annual meeting.174 
Similar and more direct forms of mandatory subsidies are the audit 
requirement for issuers and the payment of proxy voting administrative 
costs. The federal securities laws require issuers to prepare and disclose 
audited financial statements,175 which essentially means that issuers must 
hire and pay for the services of an independent auditor. In other words, 
regulators have mandated subsidization of auditing intermediaries, rather 
than leaving it up to the market to determine the extent to which issuers 
voluntarily undergo audits. Because the cost of the audit is borne by the 
issuer, shareholders pay for the auditor’s services in proportion to their 
ownership interests. 
Technical support to facilitate shareholder voting—including the 
distribution of proxy material and the maintenance of telephonic and 
electronic voting mechanisms—is also financed through mandatory issuer 
subsidies. SEC and NYSE rules require banks and brokerages to provide 
proxy information and solicit voting instructions from beneficial owners.176 
Rather than handling the process themselves, virtually all banks and 
brokerage firms have contracted with ADP to perform these services. The 
costs of the service are borne by the issuer, which reimburses the banks and 
brokers according to the NYSE’s fee schedule.177 
 
174. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1059-63 (1998) (describing the 
use of floor resolutions by labor unions). 
175. See HAZEN, supra note 88, § 9.6(2) (detailing audit requirements under the federal 
securities laws). 
176. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text. 
177. Another plausible example of a mandatory subsidy is the disclosure requirements of the 
federal securities laws. Under federal law, publicly traded firms are required to engage in a wide 
range of disclosures to the capital markets. Mandatory disclosure provides a subsidy to analysts 
and others who use company-specific information. See Coffee, supra note 28, at 729 (“To the 
extent that mandated disclosure reduces the market professional’s marginal cost of acquiring and 
verifying information, it increases the aggregate amount of securities research and verification 
provided.”). By reducing the cost of obtaining the information, disclosure offers a partial solution 
to the free-rider and public goods problems. In addition, mandatory disclosure is an efficient 
mechanism for supplying information because the issuer is typically the least-cost provider of 
such information. At the same time, mandatory disclosure reduces the incentive for wasteful and 
duplicative research by outsiders. See id. at 733-34 (“[A] major significance of a mandatory 
disclosure system is that it can reduce these costs. Rival firms do not need to incur expenses to 
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While mandatory subsidies (direct and indirect) for intermediaries 
provide one solution to the financing problem, the solution is not 
comprehensive. As in the case of Rule 14a-8, the subsidy is often not 
substantial. More substantial subsidies appear limited to narrowly defined 
areas, including auditors and proxy administrative services, where a 
consensus is easily found on what shareholders desire across the entire 
range of publicly traded firms. Outside of such areas, heterogeneity in what 
investors prefer across different companies and across time with regard to 
intermediary-provided services makes the provision of mandatory subsidies 
extremely difficult. Regulators simply lack the expertise to determine which 
intermediaries may provide the highest value for investors. Regulators also 
run the risk of imposing excessively high levels of subsidies. Some 
commentators argue, for example, that even Rule 14a-8 mandates an 
excessive subsidy because shareholder proposals do not provide sufficient 
value to justify their costs.178 The regulatory apparatus is difficult to adjust 
over time as the identity of such intermediaries and the optimal subsidy 
levels shift in response to changes in the markets. In addition, the 
appropriate level of subsidies to different intermediaries may vary by type 
of company. Large market capitalization issuers may require lower 
subsidies for analyst research and other information services than less well-
known smaller companies. 
2. Regulation of Conflicts 
Many intermediaries address the financing problem with cross-
subsidization, using the profits from related activities to finance the costs of 
intermediation. Accounting firms, for example, may subsidize auditing 
services by providing consulting services. Brokerage firms subsidize 
analyst research through investment banking revenues and brokerage 
commissions. While private market efforts at subsidizing analysts hold the 
promise of introducing expertise and flexibility (compared with mandatory 
subsidies), the private market itself may introduce potential conflicts of 
 
produce essentially duplicative data banks when a central securities data bank is in effect created 
at the SEC.”). 
As an information subsidy, nevertheless, mandatory disclosure is limited. Not all information 
relevant to the valuation of a particular company is internal to the company. See Ayres & Choi, 
supra note 79, at 341-42 (describing the importance of outside information in valuing a particular 
company’s stock). Moreover, because the information subject to mandatory disclosure is revealed 
to the entire market (reducing the value of such information for trading purposes to zero), analysts 
receive no direct benefit from mandatory disclosure. Rather, analysts can only use the information 
to complement other information they might have on the company as well as their own expertise. 
178. See, e.g., Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal To Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 
18 GA. L. REV. 425, 453-57 (1984) (noting the costs to corporations of complying with Rule 14a-
8 and arguing that the rule “probably does not produce additional or better information about 
management than that already produced by the marketplace and the Commission’s mandatory 
disclosure system”). 
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interest. In order to increase revenues, an intermediary may sacrifice the 
quality of its intermediation services in favor of its more profitable 
activities, catering to the interests of corporate managers, who ultimately 
provide the private market subsidies (through their payment of consulting 
and investment banking fees). 
The current regulatory response to these conflicts has taken two forms. 
One approach is to require disclosure to make the conflicts of interest 
transparent. These regulations are based on the perception that disclosure of 
the conflicts will enable the market accurately to evaluate the risk that the 
intermediary’s services have been compromised. The alternative approach 
is to limit or prohibit the conflicts. Examples of both types of responses are 
reflected in recent reforms to the regulation of securities analysts, focusing 
in particular on analysts associated with large financial firms that also 
provide investment banking services. 
Until recently, the SEC’s initiatives centered primarily on disclosure. 
For example, in the summer of 2001, the SEC published a brochure on its 
website, Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, warning investors about 
potential analyst conflicts of interest and providing suggestions on how to 
uncover such conflicts.179 Similarly, the SEC recently increased the 
requirements for disclosure of analyst compensation—including, in 
particular, the relationship between analyst compensation and investment 
banking revenues within a financial firm.180 Similar reforms have been 
voluntarily adopted by a number of financial firms in the wake of actual 
and threatened litigation.181 Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
required the SEC to adopt rules increasing disclosure of analyst conflicts, 
including the extent of an analyst’s investments in securities of a covered 
issuer, business relationships between covered issuers and brokerage firms, 
compensation received from the issuer by the analyst or the brokerage firm, 
and any other material conflicts.182 
Disclosure-based reforms in theory make investors aware of the risks 
they face in relying on the recommendations of potentially conflicted 
analysts. If investors react negatively to certain forms of compensation—
such as when disclosure reveals that analysts are being paid to tout a 
company through large fees paid to the investment banking arm of the 
analysts’ securities firm—disclosure may lead to changes in compensation 
structures. Disclosure may reduce the ability of a conflicted analyst to 
 
179. SEC, Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ 
analysts.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003). The SEC updated and expanded its brochure in June 2002 
to reflect recent regulatory developments, including the new NYSE and NASD rules on analyst 
conflicts of interest. Id. 
180. See Analyst Release, supra note 47. 
181. See supra note 12 (describing the Merrill-Spitzer settlement). 
182. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 501(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-6 (West Supp. 2003); see 
also supra note 14 (describing Regulation AC). 
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mislead investors. Investors, for example, may simply disregard 
information provided by analysts with poor reputations, reducing the value 
to the issuer of corrupting the analyst in the first place.183 
Disclosure-based reforms, however, are limited in their effectiveness. 
New information on analysts will often be noisy and incomplete. For 
example, not all analysts who derive compensation in part from investment 
banking revenue will be corrupt. Sophisticated investors may already have 
good information on the level of corruption among analysts.184 
Unsophisticated investors, on the other hand, may simply ignore the 
information.185 In addition, some services, such as Thomson ONE 
Financial, bundle together analyst recommendations and report only a 
consensus opinion, making it impossible to determine the potential biases 
of the analysts whose recommendations are so aggregated.186 
Structural reforms typically extend beyond disclosure and affirmatively 
limit or prohibit cross-subsidization. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act restricts 
auditors from providing a variety of consulting services and authorizes the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to impose additional 
restrictions.187 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also requires the SEC or the 
self-regulatory organizations to adopt rules to address analyst conflicts of 
interest.188 Litigation brought against Merrill Lynch by New York State 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer similarly resulted in a settlement imposing a 
 
183. Several commentators have written on the possibility that investors may suffer from 
bounded rationality and other behavioral biases that can limit their ability to take into account 
information accurately. See, e.g., Choi & Pritchard, supra note 100 (manuscript at 7-9); see also 
Langevoort, supra note 36, at 639-60 (detailing behavioral biases plaguing investors). 
184. Even sophisticated investors (particularly institutional investors), however, may take 
excessive risks and otherwise suffer from overconfidence as well as loss-avoidance biases. See 
Langevoort, supra note 36, at 641-48 (identifying “principal factors that can skew the investment 
decision maker’s attitudes toward risk”). 
185. Individual investors may lack the incentive (especially where their shareholdings are 
small) to pay attention to information on specific analysts. Even where individual investors have 
an incentive, they may suffer from a number of behavioral biases (including overconfidence). See 
id. at 635-41. 
186. See supra note 78 (describing Thomson ONE Analytics, formerly FirstCall). 
187. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201 (prohibiting auditors from performing listed 
nonaudit services). Significantly, however, Congress “considered adopting a complete prohibition 
on non-audit services by accounting firms for their audit clients, but instead decided on a 
somewhat more flexible approach.” PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING REFORM AND INVESTOR 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2002, REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN 
AFFAIRS, S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 16 (2002).  
188. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 501(a). Section 501(a) mandates rules that, among 
other things, (1) limit “the supervision and compensatory evaluation of securities analysts to 
officials employed by the broker or dealer who are not engaged in investment banking activities”; 
and (2) require that “a broker or dealer and persons employed by a broker or dealer who are 
involved with investment banking activities may not . . . retaliate against or threaten to retaliate 
against any securities analyst employed by that broker or dealer . . . as a result of an adverse, 
negative, or otherwise unfavorable research report.” Id. § 501(a)(1)(B)-(C). 
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number of structural reforms, including the elimination of ties between 
analyst compensation levels and investment banking revenue.189 
Financial firms may find ways of circumventing these rules and thereby 
continue to link the compensation of analysts to investment banking. Even 
without any direct linkage, a falloff in investment banking revenues will 
affect the overall profitability of a financial firm, indirectly reducing the 
compensation available for analysts. Analysts can readily recognize that a 
reduction in firm revenues will affect their compensation. As a result, they 
will continue to have an incentive to take an optimistic spin on the 
companies that they follow. 
Suppose, nonetheless, that disclosure, Chinese Walls, and more 
extensive separation of intermediary services from other business reduce 
conflicts by eliminating the potential for intermediary services to be 
cross-subsidized. It is unclear how analysts will finance recommendations 
and the underlying research without these subsidies. Forcing analysts to 
separate their compensation—or their entire business—from investment 
banking firms may simply result in underfunded analysts. In the long run, 
this lack of funding will reduce the amount of information supplied by 
analysts to the market. Financial firms, forced to choose between their 
investment banking operations and their research departments, may simply 
reduce or eliminate the analyst role in providing information to the 
marketplace.190 Indeed, there are indications that recent efforts to eliminate 
analyst conflicts have already narrowed the scope of analyst coverage.191 
During the past two years, research coverage for U.S. companies has 
reportedly dropped by approximately twenty percent, and forty-four percent 
of NASDAQ companies have no analyst coverage at all.192 
C. Summary of Inadequacies of the Present Legal Response 
Regulators have responded to the collective action problem in a number 
of different ways. In certain circumstances, regulators have forced issuers to 
 
189. See supra note 12 (describing the Merrill-Spitzer settlement). In a similar vein, the SEC 
promulgated Regulation FD in 2000 to curtail the ability of issuers to use the selective distribution 
of material inside information to curry favor with analysts. See Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, supra note 16 (promulgating Regulation FD). 
190. Regulation FD, similarly, works simply to dry up the subsidy provided by corporations 
through selective disclosures (by forcing companies to give information to all or remain silent). 
Companies may react by cutting off disclosure, subsidizing no one. To the extent that selective 
disclosure subsidized analyst coverage, eliminating selective disclosure may cause analysts to 
drop their coverage, particularly of smaller companies. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 
16, at 1268-70. 
191. See Susanne Craig, Left Out of Shrinking Research Pool, Companies Resort To Buying 
Coverage, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2003, at C1 (describing how regulatory restrictions that prevent 
Wall Street firms from paying for research with investment banking revenues are causing firms to 
trim their research departments). 
192. Id. 
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provide subsidies to intermediaries.193 Mandatory subsidies, however, are 
not a panacea. Regulators are not omniscient social planners and may make 
errors in choosing which intermediary activities to subsidize and in 
determining the appropriate subsidy levels.194 Not surprisingly, mandatory 
subsidies appear most common in areas in which investors generally agree 
on their value, reducing the risk of regulator error. The requirement that all 
publicly traded firms have their financials audited by an outside, expert 
accounting firm, for example, enjoys widespread support among investors. 
Other intermediaries, such as analysts or proxy advisors, do not enjoy such 
uniform support.  
Mandatory financing may also lead to conflicts of interest so long as 
management is given control over the selection of the intermediary. This 
problem has recently been quite visible with respect to the auditing process. 
Expansion of mandatory subsidies without attention to the allocation 
decision is likely to compound the conflicts problem.195 As a result, we do 
not advocate addressing intermediary financing through increased levels of 
mandatory subsidies. 
The relative absence of mandatory subsidies has left the door open for 
private market actors, including, in particular, issuers, to subsidize the 
activities of securities market intermediaries. Nonetheless, private market 
subsidies are also not a complete solution. Managers may use voluntary 
issuer-based subsidies opportunistically, leading to conflicts of interest. 
While structural prohibitions against cross-subsidization may ameliorate the 
conflict problem, they exacerbate the financing problem, robbing investors 
of potentially useful intermediary services. 
Lost in the zeal of the SEC and other regulators to curtail the conflict-
of-interest problem is the recognition that the problem exists primarily 
because of the need to subsidize intermediary services. Prohibiting 
payments from issuers to intermediaries may prevent managers from 
coopting intermediaries, but it will also reduce intermediary funding. 
Analysts without the prospect of selective disclosures or indirect subsidies 
through investment banking arms of financial firms may then find 
themselves unable to meet their expenses. Indeed, the inability of 
intermediaries to obtain issuer-based funding or to cross-subsidize their 
services may be responsible for underprovision of some intermediary 
services, such as proxy activism. Similarly, financing pressure may cause 
 
193. See supra Subsection IV.B.1 (discussing mandatory subsidies for intermediaries). 
194. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 100 (manuscript at 20-38) (discussing behavioral 
biases that plague regulators). 
195. Voluntary subsidies are subject to similar conflict-of-interest problems. In some cases, 
this has led regulators to restrict the use of voluntary subsidies, such as through the promulgation 
of SEC Regulation FD. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 16. 
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existing intermediaries to develop funding sources that threaten the quality 
of their services, such as ISS’s expansion into corporate consulting.196 
We are therefore faced with a conundrum. Not only are the financing 
and conflict-of-interest problems tied together, but existing approaches to 
financing are also flawed. Moreover, the financing problem exists across a 
range of intermediary services. We provide, in the next Part, a common 
solution to the financing problem through our voucher financing proposal. 
V.  THE VOUCHER FINANCING PROPOSAL 
The core problem for intermediaries is to obtain sufficient and unbiased 
funding. To the extent that an adequate source of funding is provided to 
intermediaries in a manner designed to maximize the best interests of 
shareholders, both the collective action and managerial corruption problems 
will disappear. We outline a preliminary proposal based on shareholder 
vouchers that relies on issuers as the primary source for funding, but 
delinks the source of funds from the authority to decide where the funds 
should go. 
Vouchers are not a new idea. In the area of school financing, the 
Supreme Court recently upheld a broad-based voucher system.197 The U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development likewise provides housing 
vouchers for those lacking sufficient financial resources.198 Since 1997, 
Arizona has allowed taxpayers to direct $500 to one of several intermediary 
nonprofit groups specializing in providing scholarships to students 
attending private schools.199 Taxpayers who choose to participate in 
Arizona’s program receive a $500 dollar-for-dollar tax credit,200 making the 
$500 contribution to an intermediary group economically equivalent to a 
voucher (usable only to finance scholarships or to increase Arizona’s state 
treasury). 
Supporters argue that school vouchers address collective action 
problems in school financing while maintaining accountability of individual 
 
196. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
197. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
198. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., VOUCHER PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK: HOUSING 
CHOICE 1-1 to 1-5 (2001) (discussing, among others, the Section 8 rental certificate program). The 
housing voucher program, however, imposes significant delays on participants. See, e.g., 
BENJAMIN I. PAGE & JAMES R. SIMMONS, WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN DO 262 (2000) (noting 
multiyear waits for those seeking housing voucher assistance).  
199. Information on Arizona’s taxpayer-directed financing of private school tuition 
scholarships can be found at the website of the Goldwater Institute, a proponent of Arizona’s 
financing program. See Goldwater Inst., at http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org (last visited May 8, 
2003); see also DAN LIPS, THE ARIZONA SCHOLARSHIP TAX CREDIT: A MODEL FOR FEDERAL 
REFORM (Goldwater Inst., Ariz. Issue Analysis 173, 2002), http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/pdf/ 
materials/113.pdf. 
200. See LIPS, supra note 199, at 7. 
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schools. Vouchers enable the government to determine overall funding 
levels, but permit individual families to direct funding for their own 
children’s education to the school of their choice. In theory, families will 
then have an incentive to shift their money to schools that provide the 
education the families desire most. To the extent that families have varying 
preferences for education, a range of different schools may arise to meet 
these varying preferences. Moreover, vouchers enable the market to impose 
accountability on schools. Competition among schools for voucher dollars 
should lead to better quality overall in the provision of educational 
services.201 
Recently, Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres have expanded the notion of 
vouchers to the arena of political campaign finance.202 As with schools, 
campaign financing is subject to a collective action problem. Many people 
may in fact align themselves with the viewpoint of a particular candidate. 
Nevertheless, each individual person may choose not to help finance the 
candidate, preferring instead to free-ride off the efforts of others. Vouchers 
targeted specifically for campaign finance force everyone to participate in 
campaign financing, leaving individual voters with only the decision of 
which campaign to support.203 
Our proposal takes aspects of voucher financing proposals from the 
school and campaign finance arenas and applies them to the corporate 
context. Vouchers allow regulators to separate the financing decision from 
the allocation decision—vesting responsibility for intermediary financing 
with issuers, but removing the decision of how to allocate the funds from 
 
201. See id.; Milton Friedman, Editorial, The Market Can Transform Our Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 2, 2002, at A21. For a general argument in support of school vouchers, see JOHN E. 
CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990). 
Of course, school vouchers do not enjoy universal support. Critics have argued, for example, 
that school vouchers have destructive effects on the educational system. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, A 
First Report Card on Vouchers, TIME, Apr. 26, 1999, at 36 (noting that critics contend that school 
vouchers will “[b]alkanize America by abandoning its common core of teachings and 
traditions . . . turning [public schools] into repositories for America’s unwilling, or unwanted, 
schoolchildren”); see also Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 
265-68 (1999) (contending that school vouchers will increase disparities among public schools); 
James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 262 (1991) (reviewing CHUBB & MOE, 
supra) (contending that “enhancement of choice along the lines [Chubb and Moe] propose would 
put even more children at educational risk than the existing system and thus would make an 
educationally (and equitably) bad situation worse”). Without going further into the school voucher 
debate, we note that these concerns have little relevance in the corporate arena. Instead, the 
relevant components of school vouchers are the general ideas that education is a collective good 
that may be financed through vouchers and that individual allocation of vouchers to education 
providers may create valuable incentives for those providers. 
202. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 3-11 (2002) (calling the vouchers under their proposal “Patriot Dollars”).  
203. Under Ackerman and Ayres’s proposal, each vote would receive vouchers worth fifty 
dollars of public monies to distribute. See id. at 4. Ackerman and Ayres also propose that Patriot 
Dollar vouchers be anonymous, preventing recipients from learning the identity of a specific 
donor. See id. at 6. 
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management control. As with school vouchers, intermediary financing 
incorporates market discipline to increase the range and quality of services 
that intermediaries are willing to provide the market. Vouchers also reduce 
the incentives on the part of intermediaries to cooperate with management 
to expropriate value from a corporation and its shareholders. 
Section A describes the intermediary voucher financing proposal. 
Section B identifies and responds to potential problems with the proposal. 
In particular, while we believe voucher financing has much to offer for 
securities market intermediaries, we nonetheless exclude the present 
requirement of a mandatory audit from the scope of our proposal, although 
we do include the funding of supplementary auditing services. Section C 
discusses the benefits of voucher financing. Finally, Section D compares 
voucher financing to a somewhat similar reform proposal put forth by the 
New York State Attorney General in conjunction with the SEC and the 
NASD. The proposal provides, among other things, funds for independent 
analyst research through a settlement with the financial services industry. 
A. A New System of Intermediary Financing 
The central principle behind the voucher proposal is that the issuer is 
the best collectivizing agent with respect to the interests of its current and 
prospective investors. When subsidies are provided to intermediaries 
directly from the issuer, all the shareholders of the firm implicitly bear the 
burden of the subsidy pro rata. Money spent by the issuer to increase 
investor information and improve monitoring redounds to the benefit of all 
investors. Improved monitoring can lead to more shareholder-oriented 
management decisions, increasing corporate revenues and profits. 
Intermediaries can also provide technical services that reduce the cost of 
corporate governance, communication with shareholders, and so forth. 
Investors will then reduce the discount they demand for securities 
investments, thereby lowering the cost of capital for quality issuers.204 At 
the same time, the voucher proposal recognizes the problem with using 
managers and other nonshareholder decisionmakers to allocate intermediary 
funding, and restores intermediary accountability by giving allocation 
decisions to shareholders. In this Section, we sketch briefly the important 
aspects of a voucher financing system for securities market intermediaries. 
 
204. As quality issuers are able to attract capital at lower cost, the allocative efficiency of the 
securities markets is improved. 
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1. Origination of Funds 
Our proposal identifies publicly traded firms as the most appropriate 
source of intermediary financing. The requirement that issuers finance 
information, monitoring, and technical services is not novel. As discussed 
above, issuers already furnish intermediaries with many types of 
financing.205 
Unlike existing sources of funding, voucher funding would be 
transparent. Prior to the promulgation of Regulation FD, prohibiting most 
selective disclosures,206 issuers routinely gave favored analysts an 
informational advantage with respect to inside corporate information. 
Analysts possessing this advantage would profit relative to other market 
participants lacking this information. Moreover, market participants had no 
way of monitoring management’s use of selective disclosure. This led to the 
potential for management self-dealing. Even after the promulgation of 
Regulation FD, issuers continued to make implicit subsidies to analysts 
through elevated investment banking fees. As with selective disclosure, the 
extent to which investment banking fees reflect subsidization of analyst 
recommendations, and the further extent to which these subsidies influence 
the content of those recommendations, cannot readily be observed by the 
market. Under a voucher system, in contrast, investors would have the 
ability to assess the aggregate vouchers directed toward any one 
intermediary.207 
Our proposal would give regulators the authority to determine and 
implement payment levels by imposing a mandatory annual fee. The 
rationale for mandatory fee-setting is twofold: First, although issuers 
currently possess, at least in theory, the incentive to set payments at a level 
that maximizes firm value, existing intermediary payments are largely 
subject to management control. Unlike investors, managers face a conflict 
of interest in determining payment levels because intermediary oversight 
reduces the ability of managers to expropriate private benefits of control. 
Second, issuers are likely to face a collective action problem preventing 
them from adopting a voucher system voluntarily. Practical difficulties are 
likely to prevent any single firm from initiating a voucher financing system. 
To the extent that investors are unfamiliar with voucher financing, the 
market may not respond appropriately in adjusting the company’s stock 
price. Scale economies may also exist with implementation of a voucher 
 
205. See supra Subsection IV.B.1 (discussing various mandatory forms of subsidies provided 
under the current regime). 
206. See sources cited supra note 16 (discussing Regulation FD). 
207. We envision that the SEC would have a role in tracking the flow of vouchers. See infra 
Subsection V.A.3 (discussing the possibility of registering intermediaries and using the SEC to 
transmit information to the market on each registered intermediary). 
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system. Investors may not find it worthwhile to invest resources in 
determining what to do with vouchers unless the investors have sufficiently 
large dollar amounts of vouchers—aggregated over their whole portfolio of 
stock—to distribute. The more companies in a particular investor’s 
portfolio that participate in a voucher financing system, the greater the 
investor’s incentive to participate actively. Similarly, intermediaries may 
not be able to finance their services on the basis of voucher revenues from a 
small number of firms. 
Individual issuers also face a free-riding problem in purchasing 
intermediary services. Payments to intermediaries may create potential 
spillover effects across multiple issuers. Analysts, for instance, may have 
economies of scale in determining the value of the entire range of 
companies dealing in a specific industry. To provide another example, 
launching a proxy contest against one underperforming company not only 
raises the value of that one firm but also increases deterrence across all 
corporations, based on the possibility of facing a proxy contest in the future. 
If an issuer’s investors do not reap the full benefit from the purchased 
services, the issuer is unlikely to purchase an efficient level of services.208 
Accordingly, our proposal requires all issuers to contribute to 
intermediary financing through mandatory, firm-level fees.209 Although the 
issuer would be responsible for paying the fee, the issuer’s managers would 
not control its allocation. Instead, shareholders would allocate the fee 
through vouchers, as we describe below. Regulators would set issuer 
payments, initially on a trial basis, which would then be adjusted after the 
effects of the voucher system had been assessed. The level of the fee for a 
particular issuer would be determined by a formula based on factors related 
to the benefits intermediaries may provide shareholders of a particular 
issuer.210 
 
208. Note that Roberta Romano has made the argument, in the context of securities disclosure 
decisions, that investors will take into account external benefits of disclosures by one issuer for 
other issuers. See Romano, supra note 23, at 2368 (“The majority of investors hold portfolios, not 
single shares of stock, and therefore, unlike the issuer, they will internalize the externality if they 
make the disclosure decision.”). 
209. One of us has written on the value of choice in securities regulation. See, e.g., Stephen J. 
Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 815 (2001). It is 
possible that eventually, after a voucher financing system gains sufficient economies of scale 
(thereby making the benefits of voucher financing for shareholders more apparent), individual 
companies (and their shareholders as a group) could be given some amount of discretion as to 
their participation in the system. While opportunistic managers may always choose to opt out of a 
voucher system, shareholders as a group will not do so where voucher financing improves the 
value of their portfolios. Alternatively, the level of voucher financing could be left to securities 
exchanges—and individual companies could opt into a system of their choice through their initial 
decision to list on a particular exchange. 
210. In general, we would expect larger issuers to obtain a greater absolute share of the 
collective benefits from intermediary services. Accordingly, factors relevant to the fee calculation 
would include issuer size, market capitalization, and total number of shareholders. It can be 
argued, however, that small issuers benefit more from intermediary services on a relative basis 
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In theory, the point at which the marginal value of an additional dollar 
of intermediary financing yields precisely a dollar of collective benefits 
should determine the aggregate level of funding required from issuers. 
Although calculating the precise amount of this allocation is beyond the 
scope of this Article, the initial allocation could be based on an estimate of 
present levels of issuer-based intermediary subsidization.211 For example, 
regulators could assess initial levels of subsidization for proxy services 
intermediation by looking to the expenses incurred by issuers with respect 
to solicitations by management.212 Subsequent reexamination of the 
voucher program would provide the opportunity to evaluate and adjust the 
formula. Regulators, of course, may make errors in determining the correct 
level of voucher financing to levy on issuers, but the cost of these errors is 
unlikely to be large. In particular, regulators need only determine the 
overall level of funding—and not how to allocate the funding, where the 
potential error costs are far greater.213 Too high a level of voucher financing 
will simply result in greater issuer levies, which can be corrected by lower 
levies in future years. Too low a level of voucher financing will still 
improve on the present system.214 For intermediaries presently receiving too 
 
(e.g., per dollar asset size of the firm or per dollar market capitalization of the firm). Market 
information about small issuers, for example, is likely to be less available than it is for large 
issuers, leading small issuers to benefit more from analyst coverage. Small issuers may also have 
fewer effective governance mechanisms, such as independent boards, for monitoring 
management, leading them to benefit more from intermediary monitoring. As a result, it would 
probably be appropriate to allocate fees in accordance with issuer size, but at a declining rate as 
issuer size increases. 
211. The Spitzer settlement, discussed in Section V.D, makes a similar attempt to quantify 
the size of the subsidy needed in the case of analysts. The settlement sets aside $432.5 million to 
fund such analysts. See infra Section V.D. 
212. This benchmark is likely to produce too low a level of initial funding. Nonetheless, the 
starting point may be beneficial. First, it will reduce waste until the market for intermediary 
services is able to expand to meet the newly created demand. Second, it will reduce transition 
costs associated with development of the information and reporting systems described in 
Subsection V.A.2. Third, too low an initial level of financing will still improve upon the current 
regime’s underfunding of intermediaries. Fourth, a low initial level will improve the political 
feasibility of the proposal by capping the level of issuer levies until the system is able to 
demonstrate the demand for and value of increased intermediation. 
213. A fear nonetheless exists that even when regulators are left to make the decision solely 
on the total level of intermediary funding, they may fall subject to industry capture. Analysts and 
other securities market professionals may use their influence to ensure an overly high level of 
funding. On the other hand, this influence may be counterbalanced by the interests of issuers who 
will not desire an excessive level of voucher financing. Because there are well-funded institutional 
players on both sides of the issue, the risk that regulators will be biased in favor of either 
excessive or inadequate funding levels is reduced. 
214. Regulators, of course, will need some method of determining whether the total level of 
voucher dollars is either too high or too low. Several sources of information may provide 
regulators guidance, including direct feedback from a variety of market participants who, as 
indicated above, may have opposing biases. Regulators will also be able to observe the extent to 
which issuers and institutions continue to purchase intermediary services independently—a 
possible indication that voucher levies are too low—or the extent to which voucher dollars go 
unallocated, a possible indication that voucher levies are too high. Of course, the number of 
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little funding (such as independent analysts and proxy advisory service 
providers), voucher financing will fund a greater level of investor 
services.215 Even where certain intermediaries already receive too much 
funding, in the form of payoffs from managers in return for manager-biased 
services, voucher financing may advance investor welfare. Once competing 
and more independent intermediaries receive financing, investors will give 
less weight to information and services provided through biased, manager-
financed intermediaries.216 Faced with a lower return from funding-biased 
intermediaries, managers will respond with a reduction in such funding.217 
The prospect of financing a collective benefit through a mandatory 
issuer-based fee is not unprecedented. As noted above, the shareholder 
proposal rule and the requirement of an independent audit are longstanding 
examples of indirect fees levied on issuers for the benefit of the market as a 
whole. There is also precedent for the imposition of direct issuer-based 
fees. Securities exchanges impose levies on listed firms in the form of 
listing fees.218 Issuers pay for ADP’s services in disseminating proxy 
material and collecting shareholder votes according to a rate schedule 
established through NYSE rules and approved by the SEC.219 Although the 
fees are loosely related to the cost of the services provided to the issuer, the 
fee structure reflects the fact that ADP’s proxy network provides spillover 
benefits across firms by facilitating the shareholder voting process.220 More 
recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established a new five-member public 
board to oversee the accounting profession.221 To fund the board, as well as 
 
unallocated vouchers is not determinative; lack of allocation may simply be due to investor 
apathy. 
215. Significantly, because we advocate only a subsidy of intermediaries (and not a bar on 
nonvoucher financing for intermediaries), our voucher financing proposal need not displace 
present financing of intermediaries. See infra Subsection V.B.2 (discussing whether voucher 
intermediary recipients should be barred from receiving nonvoucher subsidies). 
216. The extent to which investors pay attention to more independent analysts turns on their 
ability to identify such analysts quickly and cheaply. We argue below that disclosure of the 
amount of voucher dollars each intermediary receives provides investors with a quick and easy 
market metric to determine how the group of all investors views the credibility and value of a 
specific intermediary. See infra Subsection V.A.3. 
217. See infra Subsection V.B.2 (discussing whether voucher intermediary recipients should 
be barred from receiving nonvoucher subsidies). 
218. The NYSE, for example, charges a maximum original listing fee of $250,000 and a 
maximum continuing annual fee of $500,000. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL § 902.02 (2002). 
219. See id. § 402.10(A); N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., supra note 150, R. 451.90; id. R. 465.20; 
see also Proxy Reimbursement 2002, supra note 149, at 15,444 (approving the NYSE’s proposed 
proxy distribution rate schedule). 
220. While the SEC recently approved a move toward a tiered proxy reimbursement rate 
structure (more closely tracking the true costs of delivering proxies for specific companies), it also 
noted that “[s]maller issuers . . . could be substantially impacted by a tiered fee structure that 
could result in increased costs, making it difficult to pay for the proxy process.” Proxy 
Reimbursement 2002, supra note 149, at 15,444. 
221. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101-109, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77s, 78m, 7211-7219 
(West Supp. 2003). 
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a separate standard-setting body for accountants, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
imposes fees on public companies in proportion to their market 
capitalization.222 
We do not view the voucher levy as an additional tax imposed on 
public firms because voucher dollars would not be used to support 
programs that are external to the funding firms but would instead fund 
intermediary services that benefit issuers. We expect that the voucher 
program, once operational, will serve as a substitute for some existing 
intermediary costs that are currently borne by issuers or investors. In the 
shadow of a well-functioning voucher financing system, small firms will 
have less of a need to subsidize analysts or to pay them directly in order to 
obtain research coverage. Voucher dollars could also offer an alternative for 
present forms of mandatory subsidies such as the requirement of SEC Rule 
14a-8 that issuers subsidize shareholder proposals.223 In addition, the 
increased information and monitoring provided by voucher-financed 
intermediaries might improve market information and shareholder 
monitoring, leading to lower levels of corporate misconduct or fraud. To 
the extent that improved intermediary services reduce the incidence of 
corporate misconduct, substantial litigation expenditures such as those 
incurred by Enron might be avoided.224 
2. Allocation of Vouchers 
The key component of the voucher system that reflects an improvement 
over direct issuer financing of intermediaries is its separation of the source 
of funds from the allocation of those funds. Once funds are collected from 
each issuer, individual shareholders designate the recipient of their 
respective share of the issuer’s levy. Until recently, Berkshire Hathaway 
provided a similar procedure for allocating the company’s charitable 
contributions. Under its “Shareholder-Designated Contributions Program,” 
Berkshire Hathaway permitted its Class A shareholders to direct charitable 
contributions made by Berkshire Hathaway in proportion to their share 
ownership.225 Each Class A shareholder was able to designate up to three 
 
222. See id. § 109(d)(2) (stating that “[t]he rules of the Board under paragraph (1) shall 
provide for the equitable allocation, assessment, and collection by the Board (or an agent 
appointed by the Board) of the fee established under paragraph (1), among issuers, in accordance 
with subsection (g), allowing for differentiation among classes of issuers, as appropriate”); id. § 
109(g) (allocating support fees according to relative market capitalization). 
223. See supra Subsection IV.B.1 (describing SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 
(2003)). 
224. See Eric Berger, The Fall of Enron, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 23, 2003, at B1 (describing 
legal fees in the Enron litigation to date as exceeding $360 million). 
225. See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 69, 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2001ar/2001ar.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).  
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charities qualified to receive tax-deductible donations, and those charities 
then received contributions directly from Berkshire Hathaway.226 
We envision a voucher system along the lines of the Berkshire 
Hathaway program. One option is for regulators to incorporate the voucher 
system directly into the existing proxy voting process. Individual 
shareholders would be allotted a percentage of the issuer’s voucher levy 
based on their proportionate ownership interest in the issuer. Issuers would 
be required to disclose to shareholders their allotment as part of the proxy 
statement disclosure in connection with the annual meeting. Shareholders 
would allocate their share of the issuer’s voucher dollars by designating 
their chosen intermediaries on the proxy card. Issuers would then forward 
money to designated recipients in proportion to their voucher allocations. 
Piggybacking voucher allocation decisions onto the proxy ballot allows 
regulators to implement voucher financing with minimal additional 
regulatory apparatus. An alternative option would provide for the 
distribution and allocation of vouchers through a centralized voucher 
system, possibly administered by the SEC (or a private entity such as 
ADP).227 Under such a system, issuers would pay into a common voucher 
fund pool. The SEC would advise shareholders as to the voucher dollars 
over which they had allocational authority, as well as the allocation 
procedure. Investors then could either allocate vouchers individually for 
each company in their portfolio according to the respective contribution of 
that company to the investors’ total amount of vouchers, or aggregate the 
vouchers and distribute them according to a common allocation scheme. 
Indeed, we envision that the allocation process could take place online, and 
investors could even maintain a default allocation template with the SEC 
for all future allocations unless otherwise specified.228 The SEC would then 
distribute voucher funds in accordance with the shareholders’ decisions. 
The SEC would enjoy scale economies in distributing funds associated with 
vouchers to various intermediaries in the market. Once the voucher system 
was established, the incremental cost of adding additional issuers or 
recipients would be negligible. 
Under either system of voucher allocation, the voucher mechanism 
would allow investors receiving vouchers from one issuer to designate 
vouchers to an intermediary that undertakes actions impacting the value of 
 
226. See id. at 70. In 2001, Berkshire Hathaway contributed $16.7 million to shareholder-
designated charities. Almost ninety-eight percent of eligible shares participated in the program. Id. 
While this Article was in the editing process, Berkshire Hathaway announced the end of its 
charitable contributions program. See Thomas Strobhar, Giving Until It Hurts, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 1, 2003, at W15 (noting that “the program offered as many opportunities for threatening 
profits as for enhancing charitable self-expression”). 
227. For a discussion of ADP, see supra Section III.E. 
228. Such a template might resemble the manner in which many employees allocate 
contributions to their 401(k) plans. 
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other issuers. Investors typically own stock in more than one issuer and 
therefore could benefit by directing vouchers to intermediaries that improve 
the overall value of the investors’ entire portfolio.229 Therefore, unlike most 
shareholder voting, which is company-specific, the choice of how to 
allocate vouchers for most investors would take the form of a common 
choice across all the companies in the investors’ portfolios. Investors 
making a common choice face reduced information costs associated with 
the allocation decision, enabling even relatively small shareholders to enjoy 
economies of scale. For institutional investors, the economies of scale 
would be greater, and it would clearly be rational for institutions to become 
informed about their allocation options.230 
Importantly, the decision on how to allocate vouchers across various 
different classes of intermediaries remains with shareholders. This allows 
shareholders to allocate funds to those intermediaries that provide the most 
investor value at any given time. When managers at several issuers engage 
in a particularly high level of fraud, for example, shareholders may choose 
to allocate more vouchers toward activist groups bringing proxy contests 
against such managers. Through funding based on vouchers received from a 
large number of investors, proxy insurgents may have the ability to launch 
contests at a larger number of underperforming companies. In other years, 
shareholders may choose instead to allocate more vouchers to analysts, 
increasing the quality of information in the market. A successful 
analyst could collect voucher dollars from a number of investors, 
thereby supporting his or her research efforts without the need for cross-
subsidization. Unlike a government regulator, vouchers provide a flexible 
form of financing that shifts money to its highest-value use for investors 
over time. 
3. Refining the Voucher Proposal 
Although the universe of potential recipients of voucher dollars is 
finite, shareholders—even when making a common allocation for portfolios 
of companies—may still face costs in participating in the voucher program. 
All other things being equal, shareholders have a greater incentive to 
 
229. Intermediary-led actions involving one specific company may also have spillover effects 
on all companies. For example, when investor vouchers help finance a proxy insurgency contest 
against an underperforming company, the contest will deter potentially underperforming managers 
at all other companies. 
230. An investor with holdings in a large portfolio of companies, for example, may make the 
choice generally to allocate sixty percent of its voucher dollars to a voucher intermediary 
specializing in redistributing vouchers to worthy shareholder causes. See infra notes 242-245 and 
accompanying text (discussing specialized voucher intermediaries). The investor may then 
allocate thirty percent of its voucher dollars to analysts covering a large subset (if not all) of the 
portfolio companies. The investor finally allocates the remaining ten percent to an intermediary 
specializing in bringing proxy insurgent contests against underperforming companies generally. 
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allocate vouchers than to vote. All shareholders are pivotal in that their 
decision on how to allocate their vouchers will result in more (or less) 
money for various intermediaries. Nonetheless, while investors do not face 
the same magnitude of rational apathy as in shareholder voting, they still 
must decide how to distribute their vouchers. Investors may face 
information costs, lack expertise, or simply fail to participate. If 
shareholders are unable or unwilling to become informed, a market process 
for allocation of proxies will be ineffective. Worse yet, shareholders may 
simply fail to utilize their vouchers. 
To facilitate shareholder participation, as well as to increase 
intermediary accountability, our proposal also entails a registration process 
for voucher recipients, administered by the SEC. In order to be eligible to 
receive voucher dollars, intermediaries would be required to register with 
the SEC. The registration process would require that registered investor 
intermediaries (RIIs) periodically provide data to the SEC on their 
activities, the amount of voucher dollars they receive annually, other 
sources of funding (if any), and how they use the voucher dollars. The SEC 
could then publish this information in an easy-to-access format, potentially 
on the Internet, as it does presently with CEO and CFO certifications of 
financial statements,231 to provide investors with a low-cost method of 
determining how to allocate their vouchers. Our proposal would permit 
shareholders to designate one or more recipients of their voucher dollars 
from among all eligible RIIs. 
RII disclosure would provide further benefits. First, it would increase 
intermediary accountability by allowing investors to scrutinize such factors 
as the costs incurred by an intermediary, the targets of its efforts, and the 
success of its initiatives.232 Second, the registration process would increase 
transparency in intermediary funding. Although it would be possible, 
and perhaps prudent, to preclude RIIs from receiving nonvoucher 
financing in order to avoid the conflicts of interest that could arise from 
management-directed payments or cross-subsidization,233 even absent such 
a prohibition, disclosure would enable investors to identify potential 
conflicts more easily by reviewing the RIIs’ sources of nonvoucher 
financing. 
If investors fail to pay attention to disclosures, or if the information 
provided through the disclosures is incomplete and noisy, investors may fail 
to appreciate the differences among intermediaries. Nonetheless, involving 
 
231. See Statements by Company CEOs and CFOs, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/ 
ceocfo.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). 
232. Some may argue, as well, that the mere act of registering intermediaries will “lull” 
investors into trusting them excessively. The provision of explicit information on the successes 
(and failures) of such intermediaries as well as the costs they incur will work to counteract any 
such lulling effect. 
233. We discuss this point more thoroughly at the beginning of Subsection V.B.2. 
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the SEC in providing salient information on RIIs in one centralized and 
easy-to-access location reduces the information cost of voucher financing. 
Providing information on the total amount of vouchers that each 
intermediary receives gives investors a simple market metric for how 
investors as a group view the credibility and quality of a particular RII. 
Larger institutional investors (with a correspondingly larger number of 
vouchers) will drive the total number of vouchers each RII receives. An 
RII that performs better for investors over time will receive greater 
voucher allocations. Smaller, individual investors may then look to the 
voucher-received metric in determining how much to rely on a particular 
RII. It is also likely that third-party rating services (such as Standard & 
Poor’s) or institutional investors would develop techniques for reporting on 
the quality of intermediary services. 
To further address the shareholder apathy problem, we also propose 
creating an explicit mechanism for small shareholders to free-ride on 
the allocation decisions of larger investors through a proportional 
allocation rule.234 Vouchers for a specific issuer that are not affirmatively 
allocated—due to shareholder failure to respond—would be allocated in 
proportion to those vouchers that have been allocated by the issuer’s 
shareholders. Investors under a proportional allocation rule will then have 
the opportunity to free-ride on the allocation decisions of others. In addition 
to permitting efficient free riding, the rule would reduce the incentive for 
intermediaries to spend excessive amounts on advertising their services to 
small investors, who may not allocate their vouchers. Investors can also 
free-ride by using their vouchers to mirror the decisions of other investors, 
such as institutions. Regulators may allow investors to designate a 
particular institution (such as CalPERS or TIAA-CREF) and then 
automatically have the investors’ voucher allocations track that institution’s 
allocations into the future.235 An institution, in turn, with knowledge of the 
number of investor-designated vouchers free-riding on the institution’s 
allocations, may better distribute the total aggregate number of vouchers to 
their highest-value use for investors. Alternatively, as noted below, 
 
234. An alternative solution to the rational apathy problem would be to have a regulator 
adjust the value of each individual voucher either for the next round of voucher financing or, if an 
obvious funding drought exists, for the current round. Ackerman and Ayres propose such a 
solution in the context of political campaign voucher financing. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra 
note 202, at 85-87. Relying on a regulator to make adjustments to the value of vouchers, 
nonetheless, would delay financing and create the possibility that regulators might act out of self-
interest in making adjustments. See id. at 87 (“[T]here will inevitably be a certain amount of 
discretion required in rapidly calculating the relevant sums—and candidates will be quick to claim 
that the agency is abusing its discretion in favor of their rivals.”). An automatic proportional 
allocation rule avoids these problems. 
235. Such designations may be made relatively cost-free through the SEC’s own website. 
Mark Latham proposes more generally that shareholders be given the ability to imitate the voting 
decisions of institutions. See Mark Latham, Vote Your Stock (Sept. 8, 2003), 
http://www.corpmon.com/VoteYourStock.htm. 
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investors can delegate the allocation decision by allocating to an 
intermediary that specializes in redistributing vouchers to other 
intermediaries.236 
The proportional allocation rule raises the question of whether we 
should go further with our proposal and allow vouchers to be sold.237 An 
explicit market in vouchers would further enable efficient free riding and 
tend to concentrate allocation decisions in the hands of those who might 
have the strongest economic interest in those decisions.238 Nonetheless, the 
problems with voucher sales, in our view, outweigh the costs. Voucher 
sales would enable allocation decisions to become unduly concentrated, 
reducing the accountability of voucher recipients. Voucher sales would also 
increase the potential for corruption in the process.239 More importantly, 
allowing voucher sales would implicitly endorse the view that voucher 
allocations should reflect the self-interest of a specific investor rather than 
the interests of the investor class generally.240 This in turn would tend to 
further the more problematic aspects of institutional investor activism.241 
In addition to the implementation of the RII system, an SEC-
administered common voucher distribution system, and the use of 
proportionate allocation to address shareholder failure to participate, we 
anticipate two market-based developments to address shareholder 
participation problems. First, we expect intermediaries to arise that 
specialize in funneling voucher dollars to their best possible use.242 In other 
words, specialized intermediaries will provide expertise for investors 
lacking information as to where best to use the vouchers, taking a fraction 
of the vouchers as compensation.243 Individual investors may then rely on 
 
236. See infra notes 242-245 and accompanying text (predicting the development of 
intermediaries specializing in directing voucher dollars). 
237. We thank Harold Demsetz for raising this interesting point. 
238. Cf. Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
776 (1979) (arguing that shareholders should be able to purchase the voting rights of others so 
long as the purchaser has a substantial equity interest and hopes to profit solely from the 
appreciation of that interest). 
239. Initial shareholder recipients of vouchers, for example, may sell their vouchers too 
cheaply to the extent the benefit from allocating a voucher accrues not only to the specific 
recipient but also to all other shareholders. 
240. A similar policy rationale underlies the traditional prohibition against vote-selling. See 
Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 146 A.2d 602, 613 (Del. Ch. 1958) (“Shareholder votes 
may not be purchased for any consideration personal to the stockholder.”). 
241. See Fisch, supra note 26, at 1041-45 (identifying the potential for value-decreasing 
institutional investor activism when investors act primarily to obtain private gains). 
242. Ackerman and Ayres rely on similar intermediaries to redistribute their “Patriot Dollar” 
vouchers. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 202, at 72-75 (advocating the use of political 
action committees as intermediaries to redistribute Patriot Dollars from individual voters to 
specific candidates). 
243. We would not fix the amount of this compensation. Instead, specialized voucher 
intermediaries in competition with one another would competitively set the compensation. As part 
of their effort to attract vouchers, intermediaries would have to disclose and compete based on the 
percentage of vouchers that they would keep. 
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such intermediaries, transferring their voucher dollars to the intermediaries 
rather than incurring the costs of researching and distinguishing among 
different independent analysts, potential proxy insurgents, and other 
collectivizing intermediaries.244 A specialized intermediary could save the 
vouchers for use in a later year or distribute the funds to other 
intermediaries providing analyst coverage or auditing services. Likewise, it 
could rechannel funds to sponsors of specific proxy issue proposals and 
other forms of actions designed to benefit shareholders. 
Relying on intermediaries to assist in the allocation of funds is not 
without precedent. Arizona’s school choice program relies on nonprofit 
intermediaries as a buffer between taxpayers deciding where to place their 
$500 tax credit dollars and the ultimate recipients of scholarship aid for 
private schools.245 Where individual taxpayers may not have good 
information on individual potential scholarship recipients, the nonprofit 
intermediaries in Arizona provide this expertise. Moreover, the range of 
intermediaries gives taxpayers a degree of choice in how to use their $500 
allocation. Competition among intermediaries further aligns this choice 
with the overall preferences of taxpayers in Arizona. 
Second, we similarly expect competition among securities market 
intermediaries to provide shareholders with information on individual 
intermediaries. Intermediaries will compete for voucher dollars, in part, 
by advertising their services, their quality, and their results directly 
to the investing public. Because voucher dollars are not necessarily 
company-specific, an intermediary that provides beneficial services for a 
wide range of companies will have economies of scale in communicating 
this information to investors. This information—combined with the SEC’s 
information about RIIs—will reduce research costs for shareholders 
considering how to allocate their voucher dollars.246 Importantly, market 
competition will lead to allocative efficiency. As intermediaries compete on 
the basis of the value that they provide, shareholders will be able to direct 
their dollars to the intermediaries that most effectively increase shareholder 
welfare. Quality intermediaries will be able to brand themselves by 
 
244. While we believe that specialized intermediaries would add value to our voucher 
proposal, they would also add another layer of administrative cost. Accordingly, our proposal 
does not entail the creation of such intermediaries by regulators. Instead, we leave it to the market 
to determine whether and to what extent such specialized intermediaries will in fact arise, with the 
expectation that they will only succeed in the market if the benefit they provide in terms of 
increasing the value of voucher distributions exceeds their cost. 
245. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200 (describing the Arizona school scholarship 
program). 
246. On the other hand, intermediaries in competition may spend too much money on 
advertising from the perspective of overall social welfare. The SEC’s centralized provision of 
relevant information on registered investor intermediaries reduces the risk that competition will 
lead to excessive levels of advertising. To the extent that the problem persists, regulators may 
consider imposing caps on the amount any single intermediary may spend on advertising. 
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establishing a reputation based on their results.247 Through annual financing 
decisions, shareholders will be able to maintain intermediary accountability. 
B. Potential Problems with Voucher Financing 
The theory behind our proposal is that by overcoming collective action 
problems voucher financing enables the allocation decision to be made by 
those who have the best incentive to maximize corporate value—the 
shareholders. We argue that even dispersed shareholder decisions should 
generate better allocation results than decisions by incumbent managers of a 
publicly traded firm. In addition to the shareholder apathy problem 
addressed above, several additional objections to our voucher proposal are 
possible. In this Section we anticipate and respond to possible criticisms. 
1. Coordination Problems 
Voucher financing presents a potential coordination problem among 
shareholders. Under a voucher system, shareholders may fail to coordinate 
with one another on voucher allocation.248 As a result, those intermediaries 
that shareholders value most highly may be overfunded. This may lead to 
wasteful or unproductive activity by the most popular intermediaries or, 
alternatively, provide some intermediaries with more voucher dollars than 
they can productively use. Additionally, shareholders may fail to direct 
their vouchers to other deserving recipients. At the extreme, we might see a 
narrowing rather than an expansion of available intermediary services if 
shareholders systematically disregard or undervalue some forms of 
intermediation. 
We recognize the coordination problem as one of the most severe 
objections to our proposal. Any coordination problems, however, must be 
weighed against the benefit of providing market discipline in the funding of 
securities market intermediaries. The relevant comparison is not to a perfect 
world where intermediary financing is determined through an omnipotent 
social planner, but rather to the current system, which itself suffers from 
 
247. SEC provision of information on RIIs reduces considerably the cost to investors of 
distinguishing among different intermediaries. Nevertheless, to the extent investors are unable to 
distinguish among intermediaries, a lemons problem may arise where some intermediaries may 
free-ride off the reputation of other intermediaries, reducing the overall value of reputation. See, 
e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787-88 (2001). 
248. The coordination problem is not unique to voucher financing. Most corporate 
governance mechanisms that require shareholder participation present some type of coordination 
problem. Cf. Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting Systems 
in the United States, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1119 (1998) (identifying coordination problems under 
various political voting systems). 
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coordination problems as well as more problematic conflict-of-interest 
biases.249 
Several factors also suggest that the coordination problem is less 
serious than it initially appears: First, we note that many shareholder 
coordination problems may be random. To the extent that no systematic 
bias exists in investor allocations, errors in voucher allocation are likely to 
be reduced over a range of companies. An analyst who receives too few 
vouchers from the shareholders of one company, for example, may receive 
too many vouchers from the shareholders of another. Similarly, because 
investors at different companies have varying needs, the voucher 
marketplace is likely to reflect a range of intermediary services. Allocations 
from one company, at which investors desire greater activism to displace 
entrenched management, will be balanced by those from another company 
in which investors are content with management and seek greater 
technological innovations such as electronic annual meeting attendance and 
proxy voting. 
Second, although coordination problems may initially result in 
inefficient dispersion of vouchers across too many intermediaries, the 
nature of most intermediary services will make it feasible for intermediaries 
to operate effectively even with small allocations. For example, a 
shareholder activist may use a small initial allocation to fund a single 
shareholder proposal; an analyst may initiate coverage on a limited number 
of issuers. Over time, the market process should enable intermediaries to 
build reputations that will enable them to obtain sufficient vouchers to reap 
economies of scale in their operations. 
Third, short-term disparities in voucher allocation are likely to be 
resolved in a multiyear time frame. If investors discover that a particular 
intermediary has received too much financing in a given year (obtaining 
such information from a centralized SEC database, for example), they can 
adjust their allocations for the following year. Similarly, an intermediary 
need not spend all allocated dollars within a given year; an intermediary 
who is overfinanced can retain some voucher dollars to sponsor challenges 
in succeeding proxy seasons, for example.250 
Fourth, as we have identified, the voucher program may result in the 
development of intermediaries who specialize in rechanneling vouchers.251 
 
249. See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict-of-interest 
problems arising from manager-directed financing of intermediaries). 
250. In essence, the ability of shareholders to allocate their vouchers over time creates a type 
of storable votes. Storable voting has been defended as a superior mechanism for improving 
voting efficiency than existing mechanisms such as strategic voting and vote trading. See 
ALESSANDRA CASELLA, STORABLE VOTES (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
W9189, 2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9189.pdf (demonstrating that welfare gains are 
possible through storable voting). 
251. See supra notes 242-245 and accompanying text. 
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Such intermediaries would offer expertise in identifying and evaluating 
RIIs and would also offer a mechanism for coordinating voucher 
allocations, particularly for individual investors. 
Finally, and most importantly, a large number of voucher dollars will 
be controlled by institutional investors. Voucher financing is a particularly 
efficient mechanism for institutional activism because institutions can enjoy 
economies of scale by coordinating their research and allocation efforts 
across their entire portfolios.252 Institutions also enjoy relatively low costs 
in coordinating their allocation efforts with other institutions.253 
Coordination with respect to voucher financing would be far easier than 
coordination of voting, because such coordination need not occur on an 
individual company basis and because voucher financing would provide 
institutions with a level of political insulation for their decisions. 
Additionally, institutions could develop and publicly announce their 
allocation policies, thereby providing information to other investors that 
would prevent duplicative or excessive allocations.254 Significantly, our 
proposal does not rely on the active participation of all institutions because 
of our mechanism for allocating undesignated vouchers. 
Other existing programs provide for decentralized allocation of funding 
without insurmountable coordination problems. Taxpayers under the federal 
tax code, for example, may make charitable contributions to certain 
nonprofit entities and thereby receive a tax deduction.255 The deduction 
effectively makes the government a co-donor to the charity of the 
individual taxpayer’s choosing.256 As with our proposal, taxpayers face a 
 
252. Under our proportional allocation rule, as well, individual investors may free-ride on the 
voucher allocation efforts of larger institutional investors. See supra text accompanying notes 
234-236. 
253. Analogously, Jeff Gordon has argued that the relatively low coordination costs for 
institutional investors offer new potential for improving corporate governance through cumulative 
voting. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative 
Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 173, 177 (1994). But see sources cited supra note 30 (casting 
doubt on the ability of institutional investors to coordinate in ways beneficial to all shareholders). 
254. Notably, the SEC has taken some steps to enable small investors to free-ride off the 
governance decisions of institutional investors. For example, the SEC recently adopted a rule 
requiring mutual funds to disclose their proxy votes publicly. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies 
and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, Exchange Act 
Release No. 47,304, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 
270, and 274). 
255. See I.R.C. § 170 (2000). Unlike vouchers (which under our proposal would have a fixed 
value), the charitable contribution deduction leaves the amount of government money to donate 
up to the individual taxpayer, limited of course by the taxpayer’s corresponding taxable income. 
256. For an examination of the implications of allowing taxpayers to direct for themselves the 
use of funds through the charitable contribution deduction provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code, see Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 404-18 (1998). Levmore, in 
particular, focuses “on the charitable deduction as an illustration of the idea that the tax system 
can be understood as allowing dispersed donors to determine which agents, projects, or causes the 
government will finance.” Id. at 388. In responding to the possibility of a collective action 
problem among decentralized taxpayers making charitable contribution decisions without 
coordination, he writes: 
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substantial problem coordinating their donations in any single year, but 
disclosure of nonprofit funding coupled with ongoing taxpayer adjustments 
through their donation decisions in subsequent years provides a mechanism 
for responding to short-term inefficiencies.257 
Regulators could further respond to the coordination problem by 
cabining the voucher decision somewhat. Rather than allowing investors to 
allocate vouchers across different types of intermediaries, for example, 
regulators could establish different categories of functional vouchers aimed 
separately at analysts, proxy contest activists, and so forth. This approach 
would correspond more closely to Ackerman and Ayres’s proposal in the 
campaign finance context of using different vouchers for the elections of 
the President, the Senate, and the House.258 Although a differentiated 
voucher scheme would allow investors to tailor their choices more 
precisely, we view it as less attractive for two reasons: First, differentiated 
vouchers would not allow shareholders to correct funding disparities across 
classes of intermediary services. Thus, a shareholder who believes that 
analyst research is overfunded could not use vouchers to redirect funds 
away from analysts and toward proxy contests. Second, differentiated 
vouchers would require a government regulator to determine appropriate 
funding levels for each category of intermediary services. We are cautious 
about a regulator’s ability even to determine aggregate funding levels; 
indeed one of the motivations for voucher financing is the superiority of 
having investors rather than regulators determine the optimal quantity and 
type of intermediary services.259 
 
A further advantage of the charitable deduction returns us to the collective action 
problem that may be associated with aggregating preferences in order to determine an 
expenditure level. The charitable deduction scheme permits a kind of ongoing vote. If a 
donor’s decision as to how to allocate his own funds, and therefore the government’s as 
well, depends on other contributors’ decisions, then this uncertain donor can receive 
information regarding charities’ receipts as the year progresses. 
Id. at 411 (footnote omitted). 
257. Arizona’s charitable tax contribution program also provides for decentralized financing. 
See supra text accompanying notes 199-200 (describing the Arizona school scholarship program). 
258. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 202, at 76-78. Significantly, Ackerman and Ayres 
ground their differentiation of vouchers in large part on the need to protect the present separation 
of powers within the federal government. See id. at 76. (“Each elected institution has its own 
constitutional dignity; each performs interdependent functions. If one remains starved of public 
funds, this will affect the entire system.”). Voucher financing for securities market intermediaries 
has no overarching goal of protecting the independence of different types of intermediaries. 
Instead, investors rely on various types of intermediaries (and to varying extents) solely to 
increase the expected returns from their investments. 
259. On the other hand, using differentiated vouchers may force shareholders to consider the 
importance and role of the services provided by different intermediaries. Nonetheless, 
shareholders actively allocating vouchers may already appreciate the role of different 
intermediaries and, indeed, actively weigh intermediaries against one another in determining 
which intermediaries generate a greater return for the shareholders. Creating an artificial 
distinction among intermediaries may then work only to restrict the ability of shareholders to shift 
funding to those intermediaries that, at any given point in time, provide the most value. 
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2. Exclusivity and Intermediary Corruption 
Intermediary corruption is a concern for any financing mechanism. The 
capacity of voucher financing to eliminate intermediary corruption depends 
on its implementation. One risk is that company managers will be able to 
influence intermediary services. Managers intent on expropriating value 
from their companies could use corporate resources to bribe intermediaries 
to certify financial statements falsely, to provide a higher-than-warranted 
analyst recommendation, or to refrain from sponsoring a shareholder 
proposal challenging management policy. 
One simple way to prevent corruption is to eliminate the opportunity 
for outside funding. As a condition of registration, the SEC could require 
RIIs to agree to accept only voucher dollars. Those intermediaries that 
wanted to solicit market-based payments—from investors, issuers, or other 
sources—would be free to do so, but they would not be eligible for voucher 
financing. The restriction on outside financing, coupled with Regulation 
FD’s existing prohibition on subsidization through selective disclosure, 
would effectively preclude management from paying RIIs in order to 
influence their services. 
There is reason to be cautious, however, about precluding managers 
from supplementing voucher dollars with corporate funds. First, to the 
extent that regulators misjudge the amount of the issuer levies, our proposal 
may result in an underfunding of intermediaries. Issuers, in theory, still 
retain an incentive to maximize the value of their stock for shareholders. 
Some managers may therefore want to provide continued subsidies to 
remedy underfunding. Curtailing the ability of managers to direct corporate 
resources to intermediaries may therefore increase the cost of error in 
implementing our proposal. 
Second, the ability of managers to corrupt intermediaries is reduced 
under our proposal. To the extent that a ready source of funds exists 
through the voucher program for intermediaries, intermediaries intent on 
creating and maintaining a reputation for investor protection will be able to 
do so without resorting to funds directly from issuers. Managers may 
attempt to corrupt certain intermediaries, but competition from the newly 
funded independent intermediaries will reduce the effectiveness of 
manager-funded intermediaries. A promanagement recommendation from 
an intermediary known to receive funds from managers will carry little 
weight in the face of a competing negative recommendation from a 
voucher-financed independent analyst. Indeed, once investors have 
voucher-funded alternatives, intermediaries receiving financing through 
manager-determined subsidies will be forced to take extra efforts to 
convince investors of their credibility in order to remain competitive. 
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Third, under our proposal, the government will have a role in 
publicizing those companies with voucher financing. RII registration will 
operate as a certification of intermediary reputation. Intermediaries 
receiving voucher financing will also have an incentive to advertise their 
level of voucher financing. Investors can use this information to distinguish 
among intermediaries.  
A second possible form of intermediary corruption is rebates or 
kickbacks.260 An intermediary might rebate a portion of the funding that it 
receives to shareholders, particularly institutional investors, in exchange for 
the allocation of voucher dollars to that intermediary. The rebate would 
have the effect of inducing the investor to act out of an interest in 
maximizing its rebate revenue rather than allocating its voucher dollars to 
the intermediary most likely to increase shareholder wealth. This problem 
could be addressed, in part, through a requirement that intermediaries 
describe, in sufficient detail, how they use their voucher dollars.261 
Although kickbacks could arguably be disguised in the form of payments 
for business services, the problem could be reduced by prohibiting investors 
from allocating vouchers to firms with whom they have other business 
relationships. 
Alternatively, a requirement of anonymity in funding could reduce the 
potential for kickbacks.262 Anonymity could make opaque the company 
ultimately funding the vouchers as well as the investors allocating the 
vouchers. In particular, if vouchers are distributed through a central system 
administered under the direction of the SEC, there is no need for 
intermediaries to learn the source of shareholder allocations. Absent an 
ability to identify themselves credibly, shareholders will have difficulty 
extracting kickbacks. Importantly, however, an anonymity requirement has 
costs as well as benefits. Preventing disclosure of intermediary funding 
sources reduces information to the market and precludes efficient free 
riding by smaller investors on the allocation decisions of institutions. 
Anonymity may also reduce intermediary accountability by reducing the 
transparency of any relationships between intermediaries and their funding 
sources. Accordingly, although we recognize the potential value of 
 
260. The rebates provided by ADP to brokerage firms in order to attract their proxy 
processing business are similar to this type of payment. See supra note 161 and accompanying 
text. 
261. Indeed, this requirement may be independently necessary in order to provide 
shareholders with sufficient information. 
262. Ackerman and Ayres propose a similar anonymity requirement for nonvoucher 
campaign contributions under their campaign voucher proposal. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra 
note 202, at 27-28 (contending that with a “secret donation booth” a “candidate is less likely to 
sell access or influence if he can’t be sure that the buyer has actually paid the price”); see also id. 
at 25-44. 
CHOI&FISCHCORRECTEDFINAL 10/30/2003  9:42 AM 
334 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 113: 269 
anonymous funding, we do not propose that it constitute part of the voucher 
financing mechanism as initially implemented. 
A final source of distortion in the intermediary market may result from 
problems with shareholder incentives. Although voucher financing reduces 
corruption by vesting shareholders rather than management with the 
allocation decision, it may be argued that shareholders are nonetheless 
imperfectly positioned with respect to some allocation decisions. One might 
argue, for example, that because they already own stock, shareholders will 
favor optimistic analysts rather than those whose evaluations are less 
favorable but more accurate.263 This may lead to systematically biased 
recommendations. 
Several responses are possible: First, many investors will not have an 
incentive to reward analyst overvaluations. Buy-and-hold shareholders in 
companies that are not about to raise capital benefit from stock prices that 
discipline management accurately.264 Shareholders who constantly are both 
buying and selling, including most institutional investors with diversified 
portfolios, will not have a systematic incentive to favor overvaluing shares. 
Moreover, active traders will favor increasing market accuracy because of 
its value in reducing the risk facing market makers and thereby the bid-ask 
spread.265 
Second, even if some investors have an incentive to favor optimistic 
analysts, voucher financing will enable the funding of other, more 
independent analysts. Voucher financing will allow at least some analysts 
to maintain objectivity and, therefore, to build a reputation not possible 
under current law, under which the potential sources of intermediary 
 
263. Even if the market eventually learns of the overoptimism (and reduces the price of a 
company accordingly), investors may benefit in at least two ways from temporary periods of 
overvaluation. First, the company itself may have the ability to sell securities at a higher price 
(increasing value for preoffering shareholders) or use less of its stock to acquire other companies 
(again benefiting preexisting shareholders). Second, shareholders intending to sell shares benefit 
from temporary periods of overvaluation. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Oren Bar-Gill, 
Misreporting Corporate Performance 2 (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 354,141, 2003), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=354141. 
264. Moreover, even if a company is about to raise capital, diversified buy-and-hold investors 
will not benefit if one particular (low-quality) company is able to raise capital more cheaply due 
to misrepresentations. To the extent the market discounts all companies for the risk of this 
misrepresentation, other (higher-quality) companies in the diversified investor’s portfolio will 
receive a correspondingly smaller amount of capital from their sales (due to the discount). Thus, 
the possibility of overly optimistic analyst reports will not benefit the diversified buy-and-hold 
investors. Indeed, to the extent capital is shifted to less valuable uses, the resulting inefficiency 
will reduce the value of a diversified investor’s entire portfolio. 
265. Less accurate stock prices leave open the possibility that some traders may enjoy greater 
informational advantages over other traders. Market makers will react to this increased risk with a 
larger bid-ask spread, increasing transaction costs for all investors. For a summary of evidence on 
the relationship between asymmetrical information advantages in the market and higher bid-ask 
spreads, see Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current 
Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal To Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 399, 438-40.  
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funding remain unknown. Indeed, vouchers may generate an easily 
observable separation in the market because truly objective analysts will 
advertise both their objectivity and the quality of their results. SEC 
disclosures will facilitate the transparency of intermediary funding and 
performance.266 Even if some shareholders direct money to corrupt analysts, 
those analysts will have a diminished effect as the market focuses more 
attention on high-reputation analysts.  
Third, even if shareholder incentives are imperfect, voucher financing 
must be measured against the alternatives. Although an omniscient social 
planner would be preferable, it is unlikely that anyone else will have 
the necessary information and incentives to make perfect allocation 
decisions. As our Article demonstrates, manager-directed subsidies and 
cross-subsidization through investment banking revenues create greater 
risks of analyst corruption. Regulatory alternatives substitute bureaucratic 
selection for a market-based process, with the resulting risks of capture 
and error. 
Finally, the risk of systematic bias is limited to the funding of analysts. 
Investors will not have similar incentives to undermine the activities of 
proxy advisory firms, proxy insurgents, and other intermediaries, who do 
not voice an opinion on the value of a company but instead act in some 
other fashion for the collective benefit of all shareholders. While we believe 
that, on balance, voucher financing is desirable for analysts, this problem 
does not affect the application of our proposal to other types of 
intermediary services. 
It is also possible that institutional investors in particular will have an 
incentive to fund privately (outside of the voucher financing system) those 
intermediary services from which they can benefit by excluding other 
investors. This incentive may lead institutions to allocate insufficient 
voucher dollars to fund those services, reducing the efficiency of the 
allocation process. Analyst research is the most likely example. Armed with 
their separate buy-side research (as well as their present superior access to 
sell-side and independent research), institutions may profit less if research 
is broadly disseminated to the market, leading them purposefully to allocate 
insufficient voucher dollars to fund publicly distributed research. Our 
proposal works by reducing the ability of any single investor group, even 
institutions, to capture a segment of intermediary services. To the extent 
that at least some investors allocate voucher dollars to broadly distributed 
independent research, the profitability (and thus amount) of institutional 
investor in-house research will drop compared with present levels. In turn, 
 
266. See supra text accompanying note 231 (describing our proposal to register securities 
market intermediaries with the SEC). 
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this should increase institutions’ incentives to fund research through 
voucher dollars. 
3. Voucher Financing and Auditors 
In the preliminary description of our proposal, we articulated a broad 
approach in which vouchers are used to fund all intermediaries that provide 
aggregating services for investors. Intermediaries differ dramatically, 
however, in the scope of their operations. The ideal candidates for voucher 
financing are those intermediaries whose services suffer most from free 
riding and spillover effects and those intermediaries that are underfunded 
by the present system due to collective action problems. In particular, 
although auditing services present the same financing dilemma as 
proxy advisors, analysts, and other types of intermediaries, we do not 
advocate substituting voucher financing for mandatory audits of publicly 
traded firms. 
There are several reasons why voucher financing is not an appropriate 
substitute for the existing mandatory-audit requirement. First, there are 
particular administrative challenges to using voucher financing to fund firm 
audits. To the extent that a firm has only one “official” auditor, the use of 
voucher financing does not solve the problem of which auditor to select. 
Where some shareholders direct vouchers to auditor X and others to auditor 
Y, it is unclear which one, if either, should become the official auditor. 
Even if an alternative mechanism, such as the decision of the board’s 
independent audit committee, is used to select a single auditor, the 
allocation of voucher dollars remains problematic. It would be 
inappropriate either to reallocate voucher dollars that had originally been 
directed to a competing auditor or to allow an auditor to keep those dollars 
without the obligation to perform auditing services. Moreover, voucher 
financing leaves the auditor exposed to the risk that funding may vary 
over time and across firms due to the lack of coordination among 
shareholders on how to allocate vouchers.267 Auditors may respond with a 
less-than-comprehensive audit of the firm. 
While we believe that the voucher coordination problem generally is 
not insurmountable, coordination presents a particularly acute problem for 
the selection and funding of a single official auditor. Moreover, to the 
extent that investors uniformly desire a quality audit at all publicly traded 
firms, there are few advantages to giving investors flexibility in directing 
financing across auditors and different portfolio companies. Audits of 
 
267. Thinking (incorrectly) that others will allocate sufficient vouchers to an issuer’s auditor, 
shareholders may distribute too many vouchers to analysts covering the issuer (at the expense of 
the auditor), for example. One could argue that the existing legal requirement results in excessive 
production of auditing services, an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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issuers also produce limited spillover effects. Although the general quality 
of the auditing process affects the value of all issuers, the quality of the 
audit performed at one specific issuer is of little value to investors of 
another issuer, again calling into question the need for voucher flexibility in 
funding auditors. 
A decision to fund audits through discretionary shareholder allocations 
entails other substantial risks. Auditing quality is arguably the least 
transparent of all intermediary services and thus least suitable for 
shareholder choice. While investors may readily judge the accuracy of 
analyst recommendations on the basis of the covered firm’s subsequent 
performance, the quality of an audit is more difficult to evaluate. Even 
sophisticated institutional investors may lack the ability to determine audit 
quality unless the audited firm subsequently suffers financial difficulties. At 
the same time, although auditors are routinely accused of audit failure in 
cases of issuer fraud or bankruptcy, many such accusations are 
unfounded.268 
Despite our reluctance to extend voucher financing to the funding of a 
firm’s official auditor, we recognize that allowing firms (and their 
managers) to control the funding decision for auditors (including the 
funding of related consulting services) poses an ongoing conflict-of-interest 
problem. Auditors are currently the focus of a variety of regulatory reforms. 
Self-regulatory organizations now require issuers to utilize an independent 
audit committee to oversee the appointment of the issuer’s auditors as well 
as the structure of the auditing process.269 Issuers routinely submit their 
selection of the company’s auditor for shareholder ratification, although to 
date shareholders have not used their voting power to play an active role in 
the selection process.270 A variety of new regulatory reforms, including 
several sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, address auditor selection, 
compensation, and independence.271 
These regulatory reforms nonetheless may be ineffective. As we have 
observed, efforts to address intermediary conflicts by mandating 
independence do not assure the provision of adequate quality or optimal 
 
268. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189 
(1994) (describing securities fraud litigation against secondary defendants, including auditors, as 
presenting a particular danger of vexatious litigation). 
269. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., supra note 218, § 303.01. The NASDAQ and AMEX 
employ similar rules. See Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA, Special Study on Market 
Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1500-03 (2002). 
270. One factor limiting shareholder influence over auditor selection has been the ability of 
brokers to vote stock held in street name where the beneficial owner has failed to provide voting 
instructions. See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and 
Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31 FIN. MGMT. 29 (2002) (exploring the impact 
of broker voting on the passage rates of management-sponsored proposals).  
271. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 201-209, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c, 78j-1, 78l, 78q, 7231-
7234 (West Supp. 2003). 
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levels of intermediary services. The separation of auditing from consulting 
services, for example, may simply remove a source of subsidization and 
leave independent auditing underfunded.272 Moreover, to the extent that 
managers retain influence over the selection of the official auditor—for 
example, through their influence over the selection of the members of the 
firm’s audit committee—the possibility of auditor corruption remains. As a 
result, while we would not change the present mandatory provision of 
auditing services, we would allow investors to allocate vouchers to 
intermediaries providing additional auditing services. 
Supplementary voucher-funded auditing services may take many 
different forms. Shareholders may wish to fund forensic audits or to 
designate intermediaries to investigate particular types of accounting 
problems that appear to be widespread, such as earnings management. 
Voucher-funded auditors in turn might specialize in auditing either 
problematic companies or randomly selected companies. Regulators may 
assist such supplemental audits by providing voucher-funded auditors with 
mandatory rights to inspect corporate records. Supplemental auditing 
may also introduce a valuable mechanism for increasing competition 
in the auditor market by reducing the barrier to entry for smaller 
accounting firms.273 
C. Benefits of the Proposal 
Implementation of a voucher financing system for intermediaries will 
generate several benefits for investors. The overall amount of intermediary 
activity in the securities market will increase. Voucher financing will make 
it financially viable for intermediaries to provide services that cannot be 
provided through standard market transactions because of free-rider and 
public good problems. Voucher financing will also enable the provision of 
services that cannot be cross-subsidized through other business operations. 
In particular, we expect the voucher proposal to facilitate the development 
of intermediaries that will provide substantially greater monitoring and 
activism services. Intermediaries will be able to use voucher dollars to 
finance shareholder proposals, bylaw amendments, and election contests, as 
well as public and private negotiations with corporate management.  
 
272. One can question why issuers and auditors in fact rely on cross-subsidies through 
consulting services. See, e.g., supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing one possible 
reason identified by Jeffrey Gordon). 
273. See David Henry, The Big Five Beats a Final Four, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Mar. 14, 2002, 
at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2002/nf20020314_1688.htm (explaining 
how the need for a large amount of capital, an extensive and diversified client base, and 
international offices, prevents smaller entrants from competing with the Big Four). 
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Moreover, through vouchers, intermediaries will be free to experiment 
with new forms of activism. For example, vouchers may lead to more direct 
proxy solicitations, in which insurgents are not limited by the constraints of 
Rule 14a-8. Vouchers may be particularly helpful in creating a mechanism 
for greater shareholder participation in the selection of independent 
directors.274 Voucher-financed intermediaries could even play a role in 
identifying appropriate director candidates and sponsoring their nomination 
to compete with management nominees.275 By developing a reputation by 
virtue of their investigation and selection principles, such intermediaries 
can add credibility to the candidates they sponsor. In turn, investor 
endorsement of these actions, through financing, will give state courts 
greater comfort in accepting the legitimacy of increased shareholder 
participation in corporate governance. Activist intermediaries will also 
enable large investors, such as institutions, to increase management 
accountability without the coordination problems or risk of unfavorable 
retaliation that exist under current law. 
Voucher financing may also reduce wasteful intermediary expenditures. 
Such expenditures can occur, under the current system, for several reasons. 
First, shareholders may be unable to coordinate their individual 
expenditures on certain types of services. The increased disclosure and 
centralization of voucher financing can reduce the coordination problem. 
Second, shareholders may be unable to control allocations by company 
managers that are inefficient or tainted by conflicts of interest. In either 
case, the result may be overproduction of services. Voucher financing 
diminishes the impact of manager-funded research, thereby reducing the 
incentive of managers to make such expenditures. Third, voucher financing, 
unlike the existing patchwork of regulatory and private market subsidies, 
allows investors to transfer funding from an overfunded area to a more 
desirable service. Thus, if analysts are currently overfunded, vouchers will 
enable investors to transfer dollars to other types of services, such as proxy 
advisors or technical support. 
The quality of intermediary services should also increase. Market 
competition will cause quality intermediaries to receive higher levels of 
funding. Voucher financing will direct funding to intermediaries who 
 
274. Some commentators have advocated greater shareholder participation in director 
nomination. See Fisch, supra note 171, at 1162-65 (criticizing existing restrictions on shareholder 
proposals that relate to director elections); Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing 
Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. 
REV. 379, 449-50 (1994) (proposing an amendment to Rule 14a-8 that would allow direct 
nomination of director candidates by shareholders). 
275. This could also facilitate the development of a class of professional directors. See 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for 
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991) (advocating a corps of professional directors 
as a means of improving corporate governance). 
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provide useful services to investors and the marketplace. Analysts who 
provide accurate and unbiased information, for example, will have their 
research funded through voucher dollars. Voucher financing will further 
increase market information by creating an incentive for analysts, proxy 
advisors, and other information intermediaries to disseminate the results of 
their efforts widely to attract vouchers from a wide range of investors. 
Rating services and institutional investors are likely to assist market 
functioning by reviewing and reporting on the quality and results of 
intermediary efforts. Intermediaries can also secure funds by serving unmet 
investor needs. At the same time, intermediaries that fail to meet their 
commitments will be disciplined through the annual allocation process. It is 
difficult to imagine that shareholder gadflies who sponsor proxy proposals 
to further their private political agendas or simply to generate personal 
publicity would be successful in obtaining significant voucher dollars. 
Voucher financing will thus provide a market-based mechanism for 
eliminating existing conflicts in the provision of intermediation without the 
need for draconian regulatory restrictions. The availability of voucher 
dollars as a funding source will reduce the need for intermediaries to rely 
on cross-subsidization from investment banking operations or consulting 
services to finance their efforts. Indeed, an intermediary’s commitment to 
independence is likely to increase its ability to attract voucher dollars. 
Competition may lead intermediaries to focus more on addressing internal 
agency problems that prevent them from focusing on investor protection; it 
may also make intermediaries less likely to succumb to the corrupting 
influences of management. 
Coupling intermediary disclosure with a voucher funding system also 
creates a market-based mechanism for testing the impact of potential 
conflicts of interest on intermediary quality. In contrast, existing reforms 
aimed at separating intermediaries from potential conflict-inducing 
activities rely on regulators to determine the extent to which intermediary 
conflicts are permissible, creating a substantial risk of regulatory error. 
First, it may be difficult for regulators to determine the qualitative impact of 
a particular type of conflict upon an intermediary’s services. Second, the 
regulator may be unable to ascertain the extent to which proposed solutions, 
such as Chinese Walls, remedy the conflict or are only ineffective window 
dressing. Finally, regulators are poorly situated to weigh the benefits of 
independence against the costs. In particular, economies of scale may 
sometimes justify combining intermediation with related services such as 
consulting, brokerage, or investment banking operations. In contrast to 
current proposals, voucher financing does not require regulators to 
determine the optimal degree of separation. If the market views Chinese 
Walls as a sufficient guarantee of analyst independence, shareholders can 
direct their vouchers to analysts employed by investment banking firms 
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with such barriers in place. The disclosure required of RIIs will effectively 
bring such potential conflicts to the attention of investors making voucher 
allocation decisions. 
The possibility of voucher financing also reduces the need for 
regulators to engage in other forms of regulatory intervention. Voucher 
financing applied to sponsors of proxy issue proposals and proxy contests, 
for example, reduces the need for mandated subsidies such as SEC Rule 
14a-8. It thus frees regulators from the potential inefficiencies of regulatory 
meddling. Instead, shareholders will be able to reward an intermediary that 
sponsors value-increasing proposals and to refuse to support an 
intermediary that engages in wasteful activism. Similarly, voucher 
financing eliminates the need to regulate reimbursement of an insurgent’s 
expenses in a proxy election contest;276 intermediaries will be able to secure 
funding based on their ability to identify companies at which a change in 
management is appropriate and to locate suitable replacements. In addition, 
unlike regulatory solutions, which require affirmative government action to 
refine, voucher financing is capable of adjusting automatically to changes 
in intermediary structure or market needs. The responsiveness of voucher 
financing is particularly valuable in a dynamic market environment. 
D. A Comparison to the Spitzer Settlement 
The SEC, the NASD, and Eliot Spitzer, the New York State Attorney 
General, have recently pursued a regulatory reform that is similar to our 
voucher funding proposal. As part of a larger settlement with ten Wall 
Street firms and two individual analysts, the regulators obtained 
approximately $432.5 million to fund independent research.277 Under the 
terms of the final settlement, the individual Wall Street firms are 
responsible for contracting with independent research firms and for making 
the research of those firms available to their customers.278 The settlement 
does not specify criteria for evaluating a research firm’s independence; 
instead, each Wall Street firm must use the services of an independent 
 
276. For another example of such an effort, see Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 1, at 1134-35. 
277. See, e.g., William H. Donaldson, Speech Prepared for Delivery at SEC Press Conference 
Regarding Global Settlement (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch042803whd.htm [hereinafter Donaldson Speech] (same); SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst 
Research Settlements, at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 
2003) [hereinafter SEC Fact Sheet] (describing the terms of the settlements). The list of settling 
Wall Street firms includes Bear Stearns & Co., Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, the Goldman 
Sachs Group, Lehman Brothers, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley & Co., 
Citigroup, UBS Securities LLC, and U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc. See SEC Fact Sheet, supra. 
278. See SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 277. 
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consultant—who is required to report to regulators annually—to procure 
the research.279 
As originally proposed, the settlement would have employed a more 
formal procedure for identifying and evaluating independent research firms. 
Spitzer initially had called for the establishment of a new analyst oversight 
board that would have had the discretion to select and finance independent 
research.280 The resulting independent research would then have been 
provided directly to the investing public.281 In contrast to the final version 
of the settlement, the initial proposal vested authority for selecting 
independent analysts with the oversight board rather than the individual 
Wall Street firms. 
On the one hand, the Spitzer settlement demonstrates the political and 
practical feasibility of our voucher financing proposal. The Spitzer 
settlement recognizes the centrality of the financing dilemma and focuses 
on providing an independent source of financing in order to generate 
adequate research by imposing levies on financial firms. The settlement 
recognizes, as do we, the requirement that those responsible for allocating 
these funds be free from conflicts of interest, and attempts to effectuate that 
independence—in the initial proposal through the creation of an oversight 
board, and in the final version of the settlement through the use of 
independent research consultants. 
Our proposal, nonetheless, is superior to the Spitzer settlement along a 
number of dimensions. As we have argued above, in comparison to 
individual financial firms, the issuer acts as a more natural source of 
collectivizing the interests of investors. Issuers, not financial services firms, 
benefit from the provision of intermediary services. In contrast, the Spitzer 
levy operates less as a collectivizing mechanism and more as a tax on the 
provision of financial services. As a result, the settlement provides little 
accountability with respect to the quality of independent research that will 
be provided to investors. In particular, the Wall Street firms who will be 
responsible for choosing the independent research firms have limited 
incentives to search for high-quality research.282 The requirement that the 
firm consultants report annually to regulators may reduce corruption, but 
regulators are unlikely to possess the expertise to provide meaningful 
 
279. See id. The Spitzer settlement also includes structural reforms to separate analysts from 
investment banking, as well as funding for investor education and enhanced disclosures, among 
other measures. See id. 
280. See Charles Gasparino & Randall Smith, New Plan: Stock-Research Cops, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 25, 2002, at C1. 
281. See id. 
282. Additionally, there is some question about the extent to which independent research 
firms will be willing to sell high-quality research to the investment banks. See Sidel & Craig, 
supra note 52. Such sales would reduce the exclusivity of the firms’ product and possibly prevent 
the firms from continuing to sell to their regular clients. In addition, firms may fear the 
relationship would compromise their independent reputations. Id. 
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oversight of the quality and independence of the research provided through 
this process.283 Moreover, the $432.5 million fund is specifically anticipated 
to subsidize independent research for a five-year period.284 After the fund is 
exhausted, investors will lose their access to independent research.  
Our financing proposal also extends more broadly than the settlement 
by providing funding for a range of intermediary services, from analysts to 
proxy contest insurgents. Our proposal gives shareholders the flexibility to 
shift funds toward those intermediaries that are providing the highest value 
for investors at any given point in time. Importantly, this reduces the cost of 
error in determining the appropriate subsidy level. Thus, while the Spitzer 
settlement might result in excessive or wasteful financing of analyst 
research, voucher financing enables investors to shift voucher dollars to a 
more valuable intermediary service. 
Additionally, the Spitzer settlement creates troubling ambiguity about 
the factor that we identify as a key component of voucher financing: the 
allocation decision. The settlement offers limited guidance in identifying 
appropriate recipients of the independent research subsidy. Nowhere does 
the settlement appear to identify selection criteria for the independent 
research or to require that the independent research provided meet 
minimum standards of quality. At the same time, the settlement does not 
attempt to promulgate standards of independence. Despite the array of 
potential conflicts that can affect analyst research, the only conflict about 
which the settlement appears to be concerned is the one arising from analyst 
proximity to investment banking business. Indeed, by granting Wall Street 
research consultants the responsibility for allocating their firms’ research 
subsidy, the settlement has the effect of shielding the subsidization 
decisions from public scrutiny, leaving investors with no information to 
evaluate the choice of an independent research firm. In contrast, voucher 
financing vests the allocation decision in the investing public and provides 
investors with the information necessary to make an informed decision.285 
We do not mean to suggest that customers would have been better 
served by Spitzer’s initial proposal, which relied on judgments made by a 
rigid and politically vulnerable analyst oversight board. The issues that 
 
283. But see Donaldson Speech, supra note 277 (stating that regulators will oversee the 
process of firm purchases of independent research “to insure the research is independent, of high 
quality, and useful to the firms’ various customer bases”). 
284. See SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 277. 
285. Even the use of a research consultant does not eliminate the potential influence of 
investment banking conflicts. To the extent that investment banks are largely responsible for 
determining where the settlement money goes, their business objectives may influence the 
research reports of those analysts hoping to receive settlement dollars. An analyst may anticipate, 
for example, that reports containing a large number of sell recommendations may not be attractive 
to an investment bank. Moreover, despite the fact that the allocation decision is ostensibly 
made by an “independent consultant,” that consultant is nonetheless an employee of the 
investment bank. 
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have arisen concerning the first appointments to the newly created 
accounting oversight board under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act highlight the risk 
that political factors may interfere with the selection process.286 Questions 
also exist as to the independence of an oversight board dependent on money 
from investment banks.287 Most importantly, as with the research 
consultant, the analyst board would have been faced with the task of 
evaluating both research quality and analyst independence in order to make 
decisions about where to allocate the levied funds. Regulators are unlikely 
to make these judgments effectively, as evidenced by their failure to 
identify and respond to the problem created by the relationship between 
analyst research and investment banking business. 
We submit that the market—working through the collective preferences 
of investors—is better able to determine where to direct subsidy dollars 
than either an independent consultant or an insulated oversight board, both 
of which lack any direct financial stake in the allocation decisions. 
Although we are sympathetic to the appeal of allowing an idealized central 
planner to direct subsidy dollars, for the reasons described above, we are 
skeptical of the ability of a government body to act either directly as such a 
central planner or indirectly through the process of overseeing independent 
consultants. Competition among voucher recipients is more likely to ensure 
that funding is directed to those intermediaries providing the highest return 
for shareholders. The transparency of voucher financing also offers a more 
flexible approach for identifying and responding to new forms of 
intermediary conflicts of interest. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The voucher financing system that we propose represents a dramatic 
departure from how intermediaries are financed and the way in which 
shareholders interact with intermediaries and with each other. If 
intermediary financing were a relatively minor problem facing the capital 
markets, the costs of implementing a voucher financing system might 
outweigh the benefits. But securities intermediary financing is no ordinary 
problem. 
 
286. See, e.g., Editorial, Is Washington Just Faking It?, BUS. WK., Nov. 4, 2002, at 156 
(describing the initial decision of SEC Chair Harvey Pitt to support the appointment of John H. 
Biggs to head the accounting oversight board and the subsequent withdrawal of that support in 
response to accounting industry pressure); John R. Wilke, Webster Says He Will Likely Quit as 
Head of New Accounting Board, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at A1 (describing the controversy 
surrounding the “bitterly contested” appointment of William Webster to head the board). 
287. The Wall Street Journal, for example, reported: “Scott Cleland, founder of Precursor 
Group, an independent research firm that could benefit from the [research] panel’s creation said 
he likely would not take money from the panel. ‘You can’t get rid of the conflict by laundering it 
through a separate entity,’ Mr. Cleland said recently.” Jeff D. Opdyke, Stock Advice You Can 
Trust?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2002, at D1. 
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Shareholders of large publicly held corporations face a substantial 
collective action problem in monitoring managers and voting in proxy 
contests. Securities intermediaries aggregate the interests of investors by 
providing investment analysis, proxy contest advice, and other services. 
Intermediaries, however, are subject to the same collective action problems. 
In particular, the financing structure of securities intermediaries may 
undermine their efforts. Intermediaries unable to obtain compensation for 
the full benefit of their work may provide suboptimal levels of services. In 
some areas, financing problems may lead to the absence of valuable market 
services. 
Although issuer-based subsidies and cross-subsidization offer solutions 
to the underfunding problem, they bring their own shortcomings. Issuer-
based subsidies allow company managers to control the selection and 
compensation of intermediaries, leading to problems of intermediary 
corruption. Cross-subsidization generates the potential for conflicts of 
interest, as demonstrated by the recent role of investment banking 
operations in corrupting analyst reports and recommendations. Moreover, 
addressing the conflict problem alone, without recognizing the underlying 
financing dilemma facing securities market intermediaries, may increase 
the harm to investors by causing intermediaries to stop providing the 
subsidized services. Thus, although regulators can prohibit the subsidization 
of research with investment banking revenues, this solution may simply 
result in fewer analysts providing information to the market. 
Rather than tackle the conflict-of-interest problem separately, we focus 
directly on the financing problem. Solve the financing problem and the 
need for subsidies from the issuer disappears, alleviating the potential for 
conflicts of interest. The key motivating insight behind our voucher 
financing proposal is to separate the source of intermediary subsidies from 
the decision on how to allocate such subsidies. Theoretically, other 
mechanisms could provide the same separation. The government, for 
example, could impose a levy on publicly held firms and rely on regulators 
to apportion the proceeds among “worthy” intermediaries. But while we 
envision a potential role for the government in setting the level of 
mandatory payment on the part of issuers into the voucher financing 
system, we would rely more on the market—working through 
investor-driven allocation decisions—to decide which intermediaries 
receive voucher dollars. Well-known limits exist on the expertise and 
incentive of regulators to micromanage the market. We avoid these 
limitations through reliance on investors. 
While the voucher financing proposal is radical, there is ample 
precedent for using issuer-based levies to subsidize collectively valuable 
market services. The NYSE, for example, could implement the voucher 
financing proposal for its listed firms along lines similar to the method by 
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which it sets the rates for ADP’s services. Broader implementation of our 
proposal could be achieved through legislation or SEC rulemaking. Indeed, 
in comparison to the recent corporate governance reforms implemented by 
the SEC and under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, our proposal is quite modest. 
Importantly, unlike existing reform efforts, voucher financing does not 
place Congress, the SEC, or self-regulatory organizations such as the NYSE 
in the position of a central planner, charged with the task of designing an 
ideal structure to address shortcomings in the securities markets. Instead, 
voucher financing allows shareholders to make that decision through a 
dynamic process that is capable of shifting market resources to their most 
effective use in improving overall shareholder welfare. 
